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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, corporations have devoted substantial resources to 
disaster relief worldwide.
1
 For instance, Wal-Mart garnered favorable 
attention for its contributions in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast after 
Hurricane Katrina.
2
 According to company press releases, Wal-Mart 
recently gave hundreds of thousands of dollars for disaster relief in Brazil 
following a flood,
3
 and it has pledged millions in support of Japan in the 
wake of the tsunami.
4
 
Large corporations have not only the economic resources, but also the 
logistical capacity and operational expertise to make a difference in the 
first terrible days after a disaster. However, commentators disagree about 
how best to harness corporate resources to support disaster relief efforts.
5
 
This is not a new issue; the disaster law and policy discussion is only the 
latest iteration of a longstanding debate concerning the proper role of the 
corporation in society.
6
 
 
 
 1. See Anisya Thomas & Lynn Fritz, Disaster Relief, Inc., HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2006, at 114, 
114 (stating that ―American companies mobilized more than $565 million‖ for disaster relief efforts in 
Southeast Asia after the 2004 tsunami).  
 2. See Michael Barbaro & Justin Gillis, Wal-Mart at Forefront of Hurricane Relief, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A1 (―Wal-Mart‘s response to Katrina—an unrivaled $20 million in cash 
donations, 1,500 truckloads of free merchandise, food for 100,000 meals and the promise of a job for 
every one of its displaced workers—has turned the chain into an unexpected lifeline for much of the 
Southeast. . . .‖); Devin Leonard, The Only Lifeline was the Wal-Mart, FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 2005, at 55, 
available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/10/03/8356743/index.htm. 
 3. Press Release, Walmart, Walmart Commits More Than $750,000 in Cash and In-Kind 
Donations to Support Brazil Flood Victims (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://walmartstores.com/ 
pressroom/news/10528.aspx. 
 4. Press Release, Walmart, Walmart Contributes $5 Million in Response to Japan Earthquake 
(Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/10558.aspx. 
 5. See infra notes 13–19. 
 6. See C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical 
Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 78 (2002) (―Legal debates over 
corporate social responsibility stretch from the 1930s to the twenty-first century.‖) (citing A.A. Berle, 
Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For 
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom 
Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/3
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Broadly speaking, there are two frameworks for assessing corporate 
social responsibility: a ―classical‖ framework that treats non-shareholder 
interests as outside the corporation‘s proper concern, and a ―progressive‖ 
framework that encourages corporations to pursue a broader social 
agenda.
7
 According to the classical framework, corporations contribute to 
society by maximizing profits for their shareholders.
8
 On this view, giving 
managers discretion to use corporate resources for other purposes only 
exacerbates agency costs between the managers and the shareholders who 
entrust their capital to the corporation.
9
 By contrast, the progressive 
framework emphasizes that corporations owe their existence to the state 
and benefit from limited liability and other special protections and thus 
concludes that corporations have a special duty to serve a broader 
community of stakeholders.
10
  
The corporate social responsibility debate has important implications 
for disaster law and policy.
11
 At bottom, the issue is whether corporations 
can advance socially desirable objectives consistent with their primary 
obligation to earn a profit for their shareholders.
12
 Some commentators 
contend that by enhancing public-private partnerships, government can 
 
 
 7. See JOHN R. DANLEY, THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1994) 
(identifying ―classical‖ and ―managerial‖ (i.e., ―progressive‖) arguments concerning corporate 
responsibility). Similarly, Professor Harwell Wells contends that a binary structure underlies corporate 
responsibility debates from the 1920s to the present. Wells, supra note 6, at 81 (―From debate to 
debate, to be sure, the exact legal means for forcing managers and directors to assume a legal duty to 
nonshareholders changed, but the general form remains: duty to owners alone versus duties to many 
constituencies.‖). 
 8. For the best-known articulation of this view, see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility 
of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 (contending that 
management‘s ―responsibility [to shareholders] is to conduct the business in accordance with their 
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic 
rules of the society.‖) 
 9. See D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 
985, 1007 (2008) [hereinafter Smith, Response]; Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial 
Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997). Also, 
redistributive decisions made by corporate managers may lack democratic legitimacy. See, e.g., 
DANLEY, supra note 7, at 9 (arguing that ―debate over the appropriate corporate role remains a 
surrogate for debate over the appropriate role of government‖). 
 10. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World With Corporate Law, 57 EMORY 
L.J. 948, 962–63 (2008) (contending that corporations ―are state creations, and no state in its right 
mind would willfully allow for the creation of institutions as powerful as corporations unless there was 
a belief that, on balance, society would be better off because of their existence‖). 
 11. Disaster law has emerged recently as a field of academic inquiry. The first book to offer a 
comprehensive treatment appeared in 2006. See DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND 
(Daniel A. Farber & Jim Chen eds., 2006). Disaster law, according to Farber and Chen, ―is about 
assembling the best portfolio of legal rules to deal with catastrophic risks—a portfolio that includes 
prevention, emergency response, compensation and insurance, and rebuilding strategies.‖ Id. at xix. In 
this Article, we focus in particular on the legal rules that impact business recovery. 
 12. See DANLEY, supra note 7, at 3. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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incentivize the use of private distribution networks like Wal-Mart‘s in a 
coordinated effort with public disaster response agencies.
13
 With the right 
market incentives, corporations can be induced to perform a socially 
useful function.
14
 Other scholars cite Wal-Mart‘s performance after 
Katrina as evidence that profit-oriented corporations already have 
appropriate incentives and will provide necessary relief on their own 
without the waste and mismanagement too often associated with public 
relief efforts.
15
 
On the other hand, some scholars contend that the business 
corporation‘s for-profit motivation should disqualify it from serving as a 
substitute for public disaster relief.
16
 According to these commentators, 
essential government disaster relief functions must not be entrusted to 
private industry.
17
 Indeed, commentators have argued that public-private 
partnerships are inherently dangerous because private corporations can 
exploit disaster to serve their own ends and will corrupt public institutions 
 
 
 13. See Robert J. Rhee, Catastrophic Risk and Governance after Hurricane Katrina: A 
Postscript to Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 605 (2006) (―It is easy to 
see how the managerial, logistical and technological expertise of large, sophisticated private firms can 
provide superior services under crisis conditions.‖); Susan Rosengrant, Wal-Mart’s Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Striving for a Public-Private Partnership, Kennedy School of Gov‘t Case Study 
No. C16-07-1876.0, at 4 (2007). See also Barbaro & Gillis, supra note 2 (―[T]he chain‘s huge scale is 
suddenly an advantage in providing disaster relief. The same sophisticated supply chain that has turned 
the company into a widely feared competitor is now viewed as exactly what the waterlogged Gulf 
Coast needs.‖); Thomas & Fritz, supra note 1, at 117 (―What these agencies need from corporations is 
not only their wealth of funds and goods but their wealth of operational expertise.‖). 
 14. This position is consistent with a broader argument that corporate philanthropy can also serve 
the goal of profit maximization. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive 
Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 57, 68 (―[T]he more closely a 
company‘s philanthropy is linked to its competitive context, the greater the company‘s contribution to 
society will be.‖). 
 15. See Steven Horwitz, Wal-Mart to the Rescue: Private Enterprise’s Response to Hurricane 
Katrina, 13 INDEP. REV. 511, 512 (2009) (―Wal-Mart‘s successful response to Katrina, along with the 
failure of FEMA and other government agencies, seems to confirm the more general conclusion of 
modern political economy that private institutions better mobilize resources than do public agencies. 
To those steeped in the literature of modern Austrian economics, the new institutional economics, 
property-rights economics, and public-choice theory, Wal-Mart‘s superior performance comes as no 
surprise.‖); Russell S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, The Use of Knowledge in Natural-Disaster Relief 
Management, 11 INDEP. REV. 519, 529 (2007) (arguing that ―government must be removed from 
disaster management to the same extent that it is removed from all other successful market activities‖); 
Peter J. Boettke & Daniel J. Smith, Private Solutions to Public Disasters: Self-Reliance and Social 
Resilience (Geo. Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 09-29, 2009), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1720683. 
 16. See Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 17. See Corina McKendry, Disaster for Sale: Neoliberalism and the Privatization of 
Socionatural Disaster Relief, Paper Prepared for the 48th Annual Int‘l Studies Assoc‘n Convention, 
Chicago, IL (Feb. 28–Mar. 3, 2007), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_ 
research_citation/1/7/9/2/0/pages179200/p179200-1.php. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/3
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in the process.
18
 Thus, corporate altruism is not seen as a dependable 
substitute for an effective government-led response to disaster.
19
  
This Article contends that the standard story concerning corporate 
social responsibility is incomplete because it features only the largest, 
publicly traded corporations.
20
 As a consequence, scholars have 
overlooked the contributions of closely held, locally owned businesses, 
whether corporations, LLCs, or even franchise establishments with owners 
who reside in the community.
21
 Businesses are economic enterprises 
situated in a broader web of social networks.
22
 When business owners live 
where their customers live, these social networks strengthen as business 
ties overlap with other networks (school, church, recreation) that together 
form the fabric of place.
23
 Locally owned businesses play a critical role in 
long-term disaster recovery, not only because they are motivated to 
reinvest in their own communities, but because the investments have 
social and economic significance. 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I contends that locally owned 
businesses have the social capital to help communities recover from 
 
 
 18. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 
357 (2007) (contending that disasters may be used to implement broad political and economic changes 
that favor the interests of the powerful). One commentator points out that the disaster-capitalism 
theory seems to lack supporting evidence. See NAOMI ZACK, ETHICS FOR DISASTER 116 (2009). 
However, Klein‘s arguments concerning the ―many ‗indirect costs‘ in the privatization of Katrina‖ 
appear to be well taken. Id. (noting that one contractor received $12,500 per dead body removed while 
―local morticians and volunteers were barred from helping‖). 
 19. For example, if corporations are more likely to contribute when there are public relations 
benefits for doing so, they may ignore serious harms to more isolated communities. McKendry, supra 
note 17, at 12. Also, within a profit-maximizing orientation, there are limits to corporate generosity 
and the needs of disaster-stricken communities may far exceed those bounds. Id. at 13–14. 
 20. See, e.g., David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 27 (1979) (stating that ―because that is the type of corporation usually targeted for proposals of 
mandatory structural reform, I will confine my analysis of whether corporate altruism is a good thing 
to the case of the public firm‖ (citation omitted)); Wells, supra note 6, at 80 (observing that ―[w]hen 
legal commentators discuss corporate social responsibility, they really mean the social responsibility of 
giant corporations‖). 
 21. In the context of closely held corporations, questions of social responsibility have usually 
meant the obligations, if any, owed by majority to minority shareholders. See, e.g., Lawrence E. 
Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990). 
 22. The central theme of new economic sociology is that economic action is always ―embedded‖ 
in social context and ―takes place within the networks of social relations that make up the social 
structure.‖ Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg, The Sociological Perspective on the Economy, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 3, 18 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994). In 
other words, rather than seeking to resolve the tension between profit maximization and altruism, we 
contend that the traditional criticisms of corporate social responsibility simply do not apply. 
 23. See, e.g., EMILY CHAMLEE-WRIGHT, THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
RECOVERY: SOCIAL LEARNING IN A POST-DISASTER ENVIRONMENT 15–16 (2010) (―[C]ultural 
economy seeks to understand why and how market processes work the way they do within specific 
cultural contexts.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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disaster. Part II further defends the importance of social capital, arguing 
that social capital can enhance a disaster-struck area‘s prospects for 
recovery by solving economic coordination problems. Part III revisits the 
corporate responsibility debate and contends that the inclusion of closely 
held, locally owned businesses highlights social motivations for choice 
that neither position in the current debate captures.
24
 Part IV argues that 
lawmakers and responsible officials should recognize the role of locally 
owned businesses in restoring normalcy after disaster and should include 
business-continuity measures in comprehensive disaster planning. 
I. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF LOCALLY OWNED BUSINESS 
Social capital ―refers to the trust, social norms, and networks which 
affect social and economic activities.‖25 Among the most important social 
norms are ―reliability, honesty, and reciprocity.‖26 Social capital is 
enhanced when individuals participate in group activities of various kinds 
and when those overlapping relationships enhance the overall level of 
trust.
27
 In social networks characterized by high degrees of trust and 
reciprocity, ―individuals and groups‖ are able ―to accomplish greater 
things than they could by their isolated efforts.‖28 Social capital may also 
foster virtues such as volunteerism and civic engagement that are essential 
to the health of a community.
29
 According to one scholar, ―people who 
 
 
 24. Going forward, we refer simply to locally owned businesses. By this, we do not mean to 
include the headquarters of national or multinational corporations. Nor do we include closely held 
businesses that have expanded well beyond a particular region and that may rival public corporations 
in size. In short, our focus is the local economy and the businesses that comprise it. 
 25. Yuko Nakagawa & Rajib Shaw, Social Capital: A Missing Link to Disaster Recovery, 22 
INT‘L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 5, 7 (2004). 
 26. Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of Order, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2080 (2000) (book review). 
 27. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1476 (2005) (―Despite the vagueness 
of attempts to define social capital, something in the concept seems to be closely related to levels of 
societal trust and trustworthiness, and to the participation in private groups . . . .‖). 
 28. Frederick D. Weil, Reconstituting Community: Varieties of Social Capital in Disaster 
Recovery 3 (2007) [hereinafter Weil, Reconstituting Community], available at http://katrina.jwa.org/ 
content/vault/Weil_KatrinaSurveyResearchNSFProposalPublic_84af6e7d37.pdf. 
 29. Robert Putnam describes these qualities as ―civic virtues.‖ ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING 
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 136–37 (2000). 
Social trust . . . is strongly associated with many other forms of civic engagement and social 
capital. Other things being equal, people who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, 
contribute more to charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations, 
serve more readily on juries, give blood more frequently, comply more fully with their tax 
obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other forms of civic virtue. 
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/3
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trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged in 
community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy.‖30  
Social capital is an important factor in disaster recovery.
31
 Rebuilding 
physical infrastructure alone is not enough.
32
 Resilience appears to have 
more to do with social infrastructure than with economic capital: 
―Communities with more trust, civic engagement, and stronger networks 
can better bounce back after a crisis than fragmented, isolated ones.‖33 To 
a greater extent than is commonly recognized, ―[n]eighbors and friends—
not government agencies or NGOs—provide the necessary resources for 
recovery after disaster.‖34 
This Part uses examples drawn from the Gulf Coast and New Orleans 
after Hurricane Katrina to contend that locally owned businesses have an 
essential role to play in restoring a community after disaster. When locally 
owned businesses survive, they not only restore economic vibrancy but 
also replenish and strengthen the community‘s social capital. Part I.A 
acknowledges that public corporations can provide crucial economic 
assistance and may aid in the restoration of physical infrastructure. Part 
I.B contrasts the economic role of public corporations with the potential 
value of locally owned businesses, arguing that local businesses are crucial 
to a disaster-impacted region‘s social infrastructure and residents‘ ability 
to return to a normal life.
35
 
A. Bottled Water, Pop-Tarts, and Generators 
Wal-Mart‘s performance after Hurricane Katrina provides an excellent 
illustration of the potential value of large business contributions to disaster 
recovery. As is well known, the storm caught the Federal Emergency 
 
 
 30. Id. at 137. 
 31. See Nakagawa & Shaw, supra note 25, at 12 (contending that ―[d]isaster recovery is not only 
about building houses but the reconstruction of the whole community‖ and that ―social capital is a 
crucial need‖). 
 32. See Daniel P. Aldrich, Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience, J. 
HOMELAND SECURITY (2010) [hereinafter Aldrich, Fixing Recovery] (―Recovery from natural and 
other disasters does not depend on the overall amount of aid received nor on the amount of damage 
done by the disaster; instead, social capital—the bonds which tie citizens together—functions as the 
main engine of long term recovery.‖ Id. at 1.). 
 33. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). 
 34. Id. at 6. 
 35. We do not mean to deny that public corporations can act based on social connections in 
particular communities. Indeed, research concerning the social capital of public corporations—how it 
is created, how it is accessed—could advance this Article‘s central claim: that economic activity takes 
place in a social context and cannot fully be understood apart from that context. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Management Agency (―FEMA‖) unprepared.36 Wal-Mart, however, was 
ready. Its own meteorologists had been tracking the storm and predicted 
landfall near New Orleans ―more than 12 hours before the National 
Weather Service issued a similar advisory.‖37 Wal-Mart‘s Emergency 
Operations Center successfully routed trucks with ―hundreds of thousands 
of cases of bottled water, Pop-Tarts, and generators to distribution centers‖ 
outside the city before the storm hit.
38
 
Within days, most of Wal-Mart‘s stores in the Gulf Coast region were 
operational.
39
 Indeed, ―Wal-Mart employees arrived so early in the disaster 
area that they often wound up running their own relief efforts.‖40 
According to one local official, ―The Red Cross and FEMA need to take a 
master class in logistics and mobilization from Wal-Mart.‖41 In addition to 
the goods, services, and employment made possible by its normal business 
operations, Wal-Mart donated $20 million to support disaster relief 
efforts.
42
 
Other corporations also made substantial contributions. For instance, 
Dunkin‘ Donuts provided bi-weekly food shipments to aid in the disaster 
recovery and made coffee and donuts available for relief workers.
43
 
McDonald‘s gave approximately $5 million and sent nonperishable food 
items to New Orleans.
44
 SYSCO, a food distribution corporation, worked 
with the Red Cross to provide hot meals through mobile kitchens.
45
 The 
 
 
 36. See William F. Shughart II, Katrinanomics: The Politics and Economics of Disaster Relief, 
127 PUB. CHOICE 31, 32 (2006) (―Hurricane Katrina epitomizes governmental failure.‖); David A. 
Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375 (2011) (describing failure of government 
agencies to make specific advance plans for evacuation despite foreknowledge of many of the 
problems that actually arose). 
 37. Leonard, supra note 2. As is ―run-of-the-mill‖ when its stores may be in the path of 
hurricanes, Wal-Mart relied upon ―data culled from the National Weather Service and private 
meteorologists.‖ Id. 
 38. Id. Wal-Mart knew that these goods would be in demand, because it had ―studied customer 
buying patterns in hurricane-prone areas.‖ Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (―Philip Capitano, mayor of Kenner, says Wal-Mart‘s trucks rolled into his city with 
supplies several days before the Red Cross and FEMA. ‗The only lifeline in Kenner was the Wal-Mart 
stores.‘‖). 
 41. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42. See Barbaro & Gillis, supra note 2 (―Wal-Mart‘s response to Katrina—an unrivaled $20 
million in cash donations, 1,500 truckloads of free merchandise, food for 100,000 meals and the 
promise of a job for every one of its displaced workers—has turned the chain into an unexpected 
lifeline for much of the Southeast . . . .‖). 
 43. Sheau Kai Lam & Vanessa Melofchik, Strategies for an Integrated US Industry Response to a 
Humanitarian Disaster 54 (June 2007) (unpublished Master of Engineering Systems thesis, Mass. Inst. 
Tech.), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/40102. 
 44. Id. at 66. 
 45. Id. at 72. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/3
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pharmacy chain CVS ―donated approximately $1.2 million in supplies and 
money to hurricane victims through the American Red Cross and other 
local relief organizations.‖46 CVS also ―distributed water, ice and personal 
care items—goods that CVS carries.‖47 
Corporate donations of goods, services, logistical support, and cash 
provided immediate and substantial support to the victims of Hurricane 
Katrina and are emblematic of the value of corporate relief efforts. 
However, there are limits to what outside entities—public or private—can 
provide for areas damaged by disaster. Achieving true ―life recovery‖ for 
the residents requires the rebuilding of social connections within a 
community,
48
 a task that is necessarily local and that includes the 
continued operation of locally owned businesses.
49
  
B. The View from Bourbon Street 
This Part accepts the value of large-corporation involvement in disaster 
relief through philanthropy, public-private partnerships,
50
 and ordinary 
profit-seeking operations, but offers an alternative version of corporate 
social responsibility in the wake of disaster. For all Wal-Mart‘s well-
deserved plaudits after Hurricane Katrina, its assistance to the community 
should not overshadow the efforts of local establishments like ―Johnny 
White‘s . . . a Bourbon Street bar that never closes.‖51 As noted in a 
number of news accounts, Johnny White‘s held true to its motto and 
stayed open through the storm, the power outages, and the looting that 
 
 
 46. Id. at 76. 
 47. Id.  
 48. See Mayumi Sakamoto & Katsuya Yamori, A Study of Life Recovery and Social Capital 
Regarding Disaster Victims: A Case Study of Indian Ocean Tsunami and Central Java Earthquake 
Recovery, 31 J. NAT. DISASTER SCI. 49, 49 (2009) (―[I]nternational assistance for victims in disaster-
affected areas continues to be directed toward conventional needs such as housing reconstruction and 
livelihood development, often failing to fully consider life recovery.‖). Public corporations may also 
contribute to life recovery. First, if they are local employers, a decision to reopen may prevent massive 
dislocation in the employment market. Second, at least in some cases, non-local businesses may offer 
quasi-public meeting space or otherwise assist in the creation of social capital. 
 49. See Roxanne Zolin & Fredric Kropp, How Surviving Businesses Respond During and After a 
Major Disaster, 1 J. BUS. CONTINUITY & EMERGENCY PLANNING 183, 183 (2006) (―One of the first 
needs in disaster recovery is distribution of goods and services. One of the first goals in reconstruction 
is regrowth of the economy. Both of these needs are served by business activity in the community.‖). 
 50. See Mahfuzar Rahman Chowdhury, Bridging the Public-Private Partnership in Disaster 
Management in Bangladesh 395, 405, in COMMUNITY DISASTER RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY 
(DeMond Shondell Miller & Jason David Rivera eds., 2011) (―A public-private partnership is a joint 
venture operated concertedly through government and private initiatives.‖). 
 51. AFP Wire Service, New Orleans Bar Stayed Open Through Katrina and Chaos that 
Followed, BREITBART.COM (Aug. 29, 2005, 08:55AM). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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followed.
52
 In fact, the bar ignored official curfews: ―Call it madness. Call 
it anti-authoritarian pigheadedness. Or call it dogged determination not to 
let a lifestyle die.‖53 Although presented as a human-interest story rather 
than as an example of disaster recovery, Johnny White‘s was an essential 
part of the community‘s resilience. 
Locally owned businesses like Johnny White‘s have access to and 
enhance social capital, ―a concept that generally refers to ‗the stocks of 
social trust, norms, and networks that people can draw upon in order to 
solve common problems.‘‖54 The owner, JD Landrum, seemed to 
recognize as much when he told a reporter, ―You‘ve got to have 
someplace open, even during the worst of times.‖55 Initially, ―[t]he bar 
stools were filled with shell-shocked people who had swum out of their 
flooded homes to safety only to find that there was no help to be had from 
the powers that be.‖56 In the weeks that followed Katrina, ―[t]he bar 
became a community center as a tight knit group of die-hards piled water 
and military rations up outside. It soon became a favorite among 
journalists and rescue workers who needed a place they could go to forget 
the despair and destruction.‖57  
As Johnny White‘s illustrates, local businesses are part of existing 
social networks through which social capital is accessed and used. 
Additionally, they provide meeting places that are necessary to maintain 
existing social networks and contribute to emergent networks.
58
 Thus, 
locally owned businesses can be integral to achieving the normalcy 
required for the life recovery of disaster victims—―a primary aim of the 
disaster management process.‖59 A vision of corporate social 
responsibility after disaster that focuses on the economic capital of large, 
 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the 
Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1953 (1999) (quoting Robert E. 
Lang & Stephen P. Hornburg, What Is Social Capital and Why Is It Important to Public Policy, 9 
HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 1, 4 (1998)). 
 55. AFP Wire Service, supra note 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Christina Griffin, Gender and Social Capital: Social Networks Post-Disaster 79–80 
(2009) (unpublished Master of Arts in Geography thesis, University of South Carolina), available at 
http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/education/docs/christina_griffin_2009.pdf (discussing the need for disaster 
recovery support ―assisting survivors in creating and maintaining new social network connections‖).  
 59. Maureen H. Fordham, Making Women Visible in Disasters: Problematising the Private 
Domain, 22 DISASTERS 126, 130 (1998). See also Sakamoto & Yamori, supra note 48 (discussing life 
recovery for disaster victims in developing countries); Claude de Ville de Goyet & André Griekspoor, 
Natural Disasters, the Best Friend of Poverty, 14 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL‘Y 61, 82 (2007) 
(discussing desire of disaster survivors to return to normalcy). 
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public corporations misses the importance of social capital. The need for a 
more complete analysis becomes clear once one considers locally owned 
businesses that are embedded in a context of community ties and 
reciprocal obligations.
60
 
In New Orleans, once the flood receded and the initial phase of disaster 
relief ended, the status of local businesses became a vital indicator of the 
region‘s ability to recover.61 When local bars, restaurants, and businesses 
committed to reopen, their perseverance gave the community hope and a 
renewed sense of normalcy. Among the local establishments that pledged 
to rebuild at almost any cost were well-known names such as the Camellia 
Grill,
62
 Emeril‘s,63 and Mother‘s.64 Local owners who had a stake in their 
community refused to abandon restaurants and employees and often went 
to great lengths in order to get back what they had lost: ―Many restaurants 
set up FEMA trailers so employees could return to the city. Some workers 
lived in restaurant parking lots, even in the owners‘ homes for months 
after the storm.‖65  
The importance of locally owned businesses to disaster recovery is 
difficult to measure because the businesses are part of an interconnected 
web of mutually reinforcing ties. As Professors Michael Heller and Rick 
Hills explain, 
Homeowners might build up sentimental attachments to property 
simply by living in it. They develop ties to neighbors through 
connections at local churches, favorite coffee shops, bars, clubs, or 
other familiar local watering holes—what some have called ‗social 
 
 
 60. Again, our claim is not that social capital is found only in local businesses, but that the 
corporate social responsibility debate focuses solely on economic power and governance issues in 
large corporations and thus overlooks questions of community connection that are also relevant to 
appreciating the role of the business corporation in society. 
 61. See Zolin & Kropp, supra note 49, at 189 (contending that ―small-to-medium sized 
enterprises . . . are an important part of the local economy, providing jobs and fueling economic 
growth‖). 
 62. Landmark New Orleans Eatery Back in Business: Icon’s Return Seen as a Sign of Hope in 
the Crescent City’s Slow Recovery, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 23, 2007 (―Neighbors and city officials 
who frequented the diner before Katrina hugged and swapped stories . . . .‖). 
 63. Emeril’s Reopens in New Orleans, ABC NEWS, Dec. 8, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go 
.com/print?id=1385065 (―Some New Orleans residents said they found hope in the reopening of 
Emeril‘s.‖). 
 64. According to the restaurant‘s website, ―On October 15, 2005, Mother‘s reopened. Vice 
Admiral Thad Allen, the head of the disaster relief effort in New Orleans, was our first customer.‖ 
Hurricane Katrina, MOTHER‘S RESTAURANT.NET, http://mothersrestaurant.net/hurricane_katrina.html 
(last visited May 12, 2012). 
 65. Mary Foster, New Orleans Restaurants are Back in Business after Katrina, USA TODAY 
(Jan. 12, 2009), available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/destinations/2009-01-12-new-orleans-
zagat-survey_N.htm. 
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capital.‘ These connections can enable neighbors to overcome 
collective action problems more easily in monitoring crime or 
pressuring government for help in maintaining neighborhood 
quality.
66
  
What is true in ordinary times remains true in extraordinary times: in the 
face of disaster, local businesses shore up the social capital that provides a 
bulwark against community dispersion. 
Although large-scale corporations also make valuable contributions, 
especially in the immediate aftermath of catastrophic events, longer-term 
recovery requires the involvement of the affected population, including 
local businesses, to be successful.
67
 A robust local business community 
enhances disaster resilience in part because the owners have obligations as 
members of the community and not just as rational economic actors. For 
instance, social ties may influence a decision whether to invest in recovery 
or to seek more attractive investment opportunities elsewhere. By 
persevering, local businesses help to sustain their communities.  
II. THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
In addition to providing non-economic rationales for choice, social 
capital can also influence economic decision-making. This Part contends 
that social capital creates economic opportunities that would not otherwise 
exist by overcoming barriers to collective action, encouraging the use of 
―voice‖ over ―exit,‖ and reducing transaction costs.68 Thus, social-capital 
theory is part of economics, broadly understood. 
 
 
 66. Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1475 
(2008). 
 67. See FEMA News Release No. 1983-041, Disaster Preparedness Urged for Mississippi 
Businesses (July 6, 2011), available at www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=56444 (―‗Local 
businesses are a cornerstone in a community‘s recovery . . . .‘‖) (quoting Mississippi Emergency 
Management Agency Director Mike Womack). 
 68. Professor Angela Harris offers a similar analysis. See Angela Harris, Reforming Alone?, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (2002) (citing ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND 
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000)):  
First, social capital helps people resolve collective action problems: when people share social 
norms of mutual aid, free-riding is reduced. Second, social capital reduces transaction costs: 
―There is no need to spend time and money making sure that others will uphold their end of 
the arrangement or penalizing them if they don‘t.‖ Third, social capital increases a distinctive 
set of virtues, such as tolerance and empathy for others. 
Id. 
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A. Collective Action 
Social dilemmas involving collective action arise when individually 
rational behavior leads to collectively irrational results.
69
 The classic 
example of a collective action problem, sometimes called the ―tragedy of 
the commons,‖ asks us to envision a field owned in common by many 
individual cattle herders and endangered by overgrazing.
70
 This ―is a story 
about a form of social interdependence in which the collective 
consequence of reasonable individual choices is disaster.‖71 
If each herder acts in the best interest of all, she will reduce her cattle‘s 
grazing allowance to a level that, if adopted by the other herders, would 
ensure the field‘s survival. The problem, though, is that each herder reaps 
the full benefit of the grazing that she permits her herd to engage in and 
shares the cost of overgrazing with all the other herders.
72
 Therefore, the 
individually rational thing to do—the dominant strategy—is for a herder to 
allow her herd to graze as much as it wants.
73
 To the extent that other 
herders restrain their herds, an individual herder‘s defection will allow her 
to maximize her own profits (fattening her cattle for sale) without paying 
any of the shared cost. Unfortunately, if the other herders make the same 
rational calculation, the field is doomed and the cattle will starve.
74
 
 
 
 69. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
 70. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). The theory of 
the commons underlies a number of important recent contributions to legal scholarship. See, e.g., 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2003); 
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 1 (2003); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, 
Inc., 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1704 (2007); Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the 
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (2010).   
 71. David M. Messick & Marilyn B. Brewer, Solving Social Dilemmas, in REV. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 11, 12 (L Wheeler & P. Shaver eds., 1983). 
 72. See Hardin, supra note 70. For instance, a rancher enjoys 100 percent of the benefits of 
overgrazing while bearing only 5 percent of the costs if twenty farmers have access to the field. 
 73. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Properties of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1245 
(2006) (―All commons tragedies share two features: actors do not internalize all the costs and benefits 
of their actions, and those actions have the potential to reduce the overall amount of the good available 
for everyone.‖). 
 74. See Hardin, supra note 70, at 1244. (―[T]he rational herdsman concludes that the only 
sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another. . . . 
But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is 
the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in 
a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.‖) (ellipsis in original). 
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Communities that enjoy high levels of social capital may be able to 
solve collective action problems on their own without top-down state 
intervention.
75
 The ability to solve these problems is particularly vital in 
the wake of disaster when state services such as fire, police, trash 
collection, and home care for the elderly and disabled are disrupted.
76
 
Individually rational, disconnected individuals might hope that others 
would take the initiative to establish these services but would fail to 
―coordinate their efforts to bring about these desired outcomes.‖77 Why 
contribute to group needs when others may do the work for you, and, if 
they do not, your own efforts will be wasted? Social capital predicts 
disaster recovery because ―[n]eighbors with greater levels of social capital 
share information about bureaucratic procedures and upcoming deadlines, 
monitor public space to prevent dumping, and deter looting in their 
community.‖78 By contrast, communities that lack social capital may 
remain stagnant, regardless of whether they receive public resources.
79
 
The collective action problem applies as well when individuals must 
decide whether to rebuild in a devastated community: ―Survivors of 
Katrina did not want to return to be the only household on their blocks, as 
this could be risky due to both crime and a lack of social support.‖80 
Unless strong social networks and mutual trust offered assurances that 
others would return, the individually rational choice would be to leave or, 
at a minimum, wait to see what others decided.
81
 Consequently, when 
 
 
 75. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 180 (1990) (observing that self-governance requires the development of 
consensus and institutional support); JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). 
We thank our colleague Josh Eagle for bringing this work to our attention. 
 76. Aldrich, Fixing Recovery, supra note 32, at 7. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (citing Kirstin Dow, The Extraordinary and the Everyday in Explanations of Vulnerability 
to an Oil Spill, 89 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 74 (1999); James DeFilippis, The Myth of Social Capital in 
Community Development, 12 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 781 (2001)). 
 79. Aldrich, Fixing Recovery, supra note 32, at 7 (noting that ―[e]ven with grant money. . . . [t]he 
neighborhood of Mikura in Kobe, could not coordinate debris removal because no one volunteered to 
organize written agreements from property owners‖) (citations omitted). 
 80. Id. at 6. Aldrich raises this example to illustrate the value of communication networks that 
social capital makes possible and that ―cannot be replaced by government pronouncements.‖ Id. In our 
view, the choice made by many individuals and families about whether to return is a collective action 
issue. A free rider in this situation might choose to wait to see what other people decide before 
committing to return to the community. Of course, if everyone adopts a wait-and-see attitude, then the 
community will remain desolate. 
 81. See Todd Pittman, Japan: Post-Tsunami, Town Wonders if to Rebuild, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Apr. 2, 2011 (―‗We don't want to leave,‘ Suda said. ‗But if nobody else comes back, we can't stay. You 
cannot build a life by yourself.‘‖). 
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local businesses committed to reopen in New Orleans, they sent a 
powerful signal that the community would be restored.
82
 
B. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
The economist Albert Hirschman offers another perspective for 
analyzing the fundamental stay-or-go decision residents made in the wake 
of Katrina, and for connecting economic choice with political alternatives. 
Framed in Hirschman‘s terms, the issue was whether individuals would 
seek to improve their circumstances (with ―voice‖ metonymically 
representing the range of political actions available), or whether they 
would simply relocate somewhere else (the ―exit‖ option).83 
As Hirschman observed, there are two basic options that individuals 
can choose when faced with declining quality in an organization.
84
 First, 
there is the ―exit‖ option: ―Some customers stop buying the firm‘s 
products or . . . leave the organization.‖85 Shareholders in a publicly traded 
corporation typically react to negative information by selling stock. The 
resulting decline in the firm‘s market value sends a message to 
management to fix the problem.
86
 No words are needed. Thus, because the 
message is communicated via market price information, Hirschman 
characterizes exit in economic terms.
87
 
Alternatively, an individual may exercise her ―voice‖ option.88 This 
choice involves political participation; ideas for improvement are 
 
 
 82. See Emily Chamlee-Wright, The Long Road Back: Signal Noise in the Post-Katrina Context, 
12 INDEP. REV. 235, 238 (2007) (noting the importance of signals sent by reopened businesses but 
contending that these signals were to some extent masked by ―[d]isaster-relief policies and procedures, 
government management of flood-protection and flood insurance programs, and the regime 
uncertainty created by postdisaster redevelopment planning‖). Professor Chamlee-Wright argues that 
absent these distortions, business decisions ―would guide swift and responsible adjustment to the new 
circumstances.‖ Id. 
 83. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). We exclude from consideration here questions regarding the 
wisdom of rebuilding in certain areas. See, e.g., Ian Jared Miller, Bitter Legacy, Injured Coast, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at C10 (―In a landscape where earthquakes are a regular occurrence but major 
tsunamis happen irregularly, people naturally forget.‖). 
 84. After a disaster, ―declining quality‖ may mean the disruption of even basic services. 
 85. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 83, at 4. 
 86. Id. at 23 (―[U]pon finding out about customer desertion, management undertakes to repair its 
failings.‖). 
 87. Id. at 15–16 (―This is the sort of mechanism economics thrives on. It is neat—one either exits 
or one does not; it is impersonal . . . and success and failure of the organization are communicated to it 
by a set of statistics; and it is indirect—any recovery on the part of the declining firm comes by 
courtesy of the Invisible Hand, as an unintended by-product of the customer‘s decision to shift.‖). 
 88. Id. at 30 (―Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, 
an objectionable state of affairs . . . .‖). See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the 
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communicated directly through interest articulation.
89
 For instance, an 
unhappy consumer could write a letter of complaint to a business 
demanding better service. Or shareholders might seek to elect new 
directors or to push through a proposal for corporate change. In situations 
in which exit is more difficult—from families and nations, for instance—
voice becomes correspondingly more important as a mechanism for 
change.
90
  
According to one commentator, ―[s]trong social networks raise the cost 
of exit from a community and increase the probability that residents will 
exercise voice to join rebuilding efforts.‖91 Although the connection 
between social networks and exit cost is not elaborated, it seems plausible 
to suppose that an individual who benefits from reciprocal arrangements 
of trust in a particular community would be disinclined to start over 
among strangers elsewhere. The effort involved in replicating those 
arrangements as well as the uncertainty of result when engaging a foreign 
social network or creating one anew would increase the costs of exit.
92
 
These costs, in turn, make exit less likely. 
In our view, however, social capital also has potential relevance as a 
way of elaborating ―loyalty,‖ Hirschman‘s third, linking concept. In some 
situations, it may be unclear whether exit, voice, or some combination of 
the two is the right choice, and Hirschman surmised that loyalty among 
organization members would influence the decision.
93
 When loyalty is 
high, a customer, shareholder, or community member will hesitate to 
 
 
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (2010) (contending that in areas where state sovereignty is 
limited, ―institutional arrangements promote voice, not exit‖); Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse 
Theory of the Firm after Citizens United, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 164 (2010) (contending that 
―shareholders require a greater voice in the deliberative process that leads to the selection of 
directors‖). 
 89. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 83, at 16 (―[V]oice is just the opposite of exit. It is a far more 
‗messy‘ concept because it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest; it 
implies articulation of one‘s critical opinions rather than a private, ‗secret‘ vote in the anonymity of a 
supermarket . . . .‖). 
 90. Id. at 17 (―In a whole gamut of human institutions, from the state to the family, voice, 
however ‗cumbrous,‘ is all their members normally have to work with.‖). One of this Article‘s authors 
has previously developed an argument for enhanced scrutiny of majority shareholder actions in close 
corporations based upon the same premise. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for 
Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207 
(2009). 
 91. Aldrich, Fixing Recovery, supra note 32, at 7–8. 
 92. In accounting terms, this cost could be described as a loss of goodwill—the value of a 
business in excess of its assets that includes customer loyalty and reputation. 
 93. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 83, at 82 (―Loyalty is a key concept in the battle between exit 
and voice . . . .‖). 
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exit.
94
 He or she is also more likely to use voice.
95
 By contrast, when an 
individual feels no particular loyalty, exit may be the simpler, more 
rational decision.
96
 
Notably, the benefits Hirschman ascribes to loyalty are also the civic 
virtues that follow from high levels of social capital. As one scholar 
observes, focusing on a context in which social capital tends to be high, 
―virtually all forms of altruism—volunteerism, community projects, 
philanthropy, directions for strangers, aid for the afflicted, and so on—are 
demonstrably more common in small towns.‖97 After a disaster, these civic 
virtues become critically important because the community‘s survival 
depends upon mutual aid.
98
  
To the extent that social capital enhances loyalty, therefore, it may 
influence members of a community to use voice and to reinvest in the 
community.
99
 For example, one researcher found substantial evidence that, 
in the wake of a major earthquake, the Tokyo neighborhoods with the 
most social capital experienced ―stronger population recovery.‖100 Thus, 
social capital theory can be seen as a way of extending Hirschman‘s 
framework by providing a more robust theory of loyalty and trust.
101
 
C. Transaction Costs 
Social capital may also facilitate rebuilding in the wake of disasters by 
reducing what economists refer to as transaction costs.
102
 Before a market 
exchange takes place, the participants need to acquire information about 
the proposed transaction, they must negotiate the terms, and they must be 
able to monitor the other party‘s performance. Although some economic 
 
 
 94. Id. at 77 (―Clearly the presence of loyalty makes exit less likely . . . .‖). 
 95. Id. (stating that ―the likelihood of voice increases with the degree of loyalty‖). 
 96. Id. at 82–83 (―In the absence of feelings of loyalty, exit per se is essentially costless, except 
for the cost of gathering information about alternative products and organizations.‖). 
 97. PUTNAM, supra note 29, at 138. 
 98. See Aldrich, Fixing Recovery, supra note 32, at 6 (―Information and signals from civil 
society—such as ‗who is coming back when and what services will be provided‘—are critical to 
decision-making processes of survivors, and cannot be replaced by government pronouncements.‖). 
 99. Also, in reciprocal social networks one might expect that one‘s view would at least be heard. 
See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 83, at 37 (―[T]he decision whether to exit will often be taken in the light 
of the prospects for the effective use of voice. If customers are sufficiently convinced that voice will 
be effective, then they may well postpone exit.‖) (emphasis removed).  
 100. Daniel P. Aldrich, Social, Not Physical, Infrastructure: The Critical Role of Civil Society 
after the 1923 Tokyo Earthquake 20 (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=1017&context=daniel_aldrich [hereinafter Aldrich, Social, Not Physical, Infrastructure]. 
 101. We hope to further develop the connection between Hirschman‘s theory of loyalty and social 
capital in future work. 
 102. See Harris, supra note 68, at 1458. 
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models assume zero transaction costs, most real-world exchanges involve 
significant costs.
103
 When the costs are high, otherwise efficient exchanges 
may not take place.
104
 
Consider, for instance, the decision whether to open a restaurant in an 
area damaged by disaster. Although one might anticipate a market need 
that such a restaurant could serve, the first hurdle would be gathering 
information about the region. Are there reliable patrons? How does one 
acquire the necessary licenses to do business? Will suppliers sell food 
products at reasonable prices? Having gathered the necessary 
information—a time consuming and costly process—the prospective 
restaurant owner would need to negotiate with suppliers and hire people to 
build and to run the restaurant. Finally, the owner would need to invest 
substantial energy monitoring her employees to ensure that they devoted 
their full efforts to the business and did not shirk their duties.
105
 
An interested restaurant owner who is already part of a social network 
may benefit from reduced transaction costs for each of these tasks. First, 
information will be more readily available: the owner will know whom to 
ask, what to ask, and where to look. Second, negotiations within existing 
networks can be cheaper if trust exists as a lubricant.
106
 Rather than 
negotiating each detail and worrying about whether the prices requested 
are fair, trust permits business participants to rely (to some degree) on the 
good faith of their counter-parties. Further, social capital ensures that the 
prices charged by suppliers, in fact, will be fair.
107
 Finally, social 
connections of loyalty reduce the risk that employees will steal or 
 
 
 103. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (―Lawyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising 
efficient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory's hypothetical world of 
perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in this world.‖) (emphasis in 
original). 
 104. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960); Zohar 
Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CALIF. L. 
REV. 393, 414 (2003). 
 105. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. 
CORP. L. 657, 670 (1996) (defining agency costs ―as the sum of the monitoring and bonding costs, plus 
any residual loss, incurred to prevent shirking by agents‖). As Professor Bainbridge explains, ―an 
essential economic function of management is monitoring the various inputs into the team effort.‖ Id. 
at 671. 
 106. See Steven Knack & Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation, 112 Q. J. ECON. 1251, 1252 (1997) (―Economic activities that require some 
agents to rely on the future actions of others are accomplished at lower cost in higher-trust 
environments.‖). Indeed, ―[v]irtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of 
trust.‖ Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972). 
 107. See Knack & Keefer, supra note 106, at 1252 (―Individuals in higher-trust societies spend 
less to protect themselves from being exploited in economic transactions.‖). 
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otherwise default in their duties, and this, in turn, lowers monitoring 
costs.
108
 Thus, economic transactions in communities with high social 
capital can be more efficient. 
The importance of social capital in reducing transaction costs is 
reflected in the ethnic homogeneity of many business communities, 
including, for instance, Korean grocers in New York, Pakistani and Indian 
budget motel owners in New York, and Soviet Jewish cab drivers in Los 
Angeles.
109
 Of course, the connection of race, ethnicity, and social capital 
creates its own legal challenges and may have troubling implications 
concerning disaster resilience and diversity.
110
 From an economic 
standpoint, however, social capital has clear advantages. Locally owned 
businesses, situated in particular communities, whether distinguished by 
ethnic or other markers, can take advantage of trust and social networks to 
reduce their costs of operation.
111
 For communities to recover from 
disaster quickly, the efficient operation of locally owned businesses, and 
their ability to tap into existing social networks, may be critical. 
 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Lan Cao, The Ethnic Question in Law and Development, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1044, 1057–
58 (2004) (reviewing AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY 
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY (2003)). Additional ethnic minority enclaves 
include ―Arab[] and Lebanese Muslim[] . . . grocery stores in Chicago and Detroit, respectively‖ and 
Korean ―wig stores nationwide.‖ Id. 
 110. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 754 (2011) 
(responding to the ―challenge‖ that if ―diversity dramatically decreases social capital in the short to 
medium run, this should be a national concern that cannot be answered with anodyne calls to 
‗celebrate diversity‘‖).  
 111. J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer, Coordination of Economic Actors and Social 
Systems of Production, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 1, 11 
(J. Roger Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997) (―All other things being equal, the more powerful 
the social bonds among transacting partners, the more economic competition is likely to be 
restrained.‖). But see Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern 
Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 15 (1998) (noting that ―the same strong ties that bring benefits to 
members of a group commonly enable it to bar others from access‖). Professor Portes cites as 
examples ―control exercised by white ethnics . . . over the construction trades and the fire and police 
unions of New York[,] . . . the growing control of the produce business by Korean immigrants in 
several East Coast cities, the traditional monopoly of Jewish merchants over the New York diamond 
trade, and the dominance of Cubans over numerous sectors of the Miami economy.‖ Id. ―In each 
instance, social capital generated by bounded solidarity and trust are at the core of the group‘s 
economic advance.‖ Id. However, ―the same social relations that . . . enhance the ease and efficiency 
of economic exchanges among community members implicitly restrict outsiders.‖ Id. (ellipsis in 
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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D. Slinging Arrows at Social-Capital Theory
112
 
Kenneth Arrow, a Nobel Laureate in economics, admits ―the 
plausibility of the hypothesis that social networks can affect economic 
performance,‖113 but he raises concerns about social capital as a concept. 
First, Arrow observes that there is nothing inherently good about a social 
network—the influence of other members of the network can spread bad 
behavior as easily as good behavior.
114
 Second, social networks are not 
usually built to serve economic purposes and are largely their own 
reward.
115
 Thus, it is not clear to Arrow why social networks should count 
as ―capital.‖ He contends that the metaphor is misleading and should be 
discarded.
116
 
Undoubtedly, social networks can be misused; they may help teenage 
gang members organize as easily as other social networks help adults 
monitor the neighborhoods in which those gangs operate.
117
 Social capital 
is important, not because there can be any guarantee that the capital will 
always be spent towards worthwhile ends, but because it greatly increases 
the effectiveness of individual activity. The fact that social networks of 
trust can be misused only heightens the importance of understanding their 
character.
118
 
Further, although social capital is a metaphor, it is a helpful metaphor 
because it sharpens the distinction between conventional economic 
reasoning and the social factors that influence individual choice.
119
 
 
 
 112. Cf. Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social 
Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990). 
 113. Kenneth J. Arrow, Observations on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: A MULTIFACETED 
PERSPECTIVE 3, 3 (Partha Dasgupta & Ismail Serageldin eds., 2000). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 4; see also Carl L. Bankston III & Min Zhou, Social Capital as Process: The Meanings 
and Problems of a Theoretical Metaphor, 72 SOC. INQUIRY 285, 285 (2002) (―The term ‗capital‘ refers 
to resources for investment. . . . However, social capital . . . does not consist of resources that are held 
by individuals or by groups but of processes of social interaction leading to constructive outcomes.‖); 
Nakagawa & Shaw, supra note 25, at 9 (criticizing the term ―social capital‖ for its ―over-versatility‖) 
(citing Tom Schuller et al., Social Capital: A Review and Critique, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 1 (Stephen Baron et al. eds., 2000)). 
 117. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 983 (2010). 
 118. Police departments, for instance, might recognize the special danger of gang activity in areas 
affected by disaster. See Susan S. Kuo, Bringing in the State: Toward a Constitutional Duty to Protect 
from Mob Violence, 79 IND. L.J. 177, 222 (2004) (arguing that social science evidence is relevant in 
determining whether police officials have breached a duty to the public by failing to respond 
appropriately to riot harm). 
 119. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of 
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 326 (2004) (―The social capital 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/3
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Nothing turns on the fact that social capital is a metaphor—so is economic 
capital
120
 and, for that matter, the idea of a financial marketplace.
121
 
However, Arrow may be right to worry about the ―snare‖ of seeking to 
measure social capital with more precision than the concept will bear.
122
 
He suggests that 
Instead of thinking of more and less, it may be more fruitful to think 
of the existing social relations as a preexisting network into which 
new parts of the economy (for example, development projects) have 
to be fitted. We would want to fit new projects so as to exploit 
complementarity relations and avoid rivalries. Of course, new 
projects will create their own unintended social relations, possibly 
destroying existing ones.
123
 
Even if social networks cannot be measured with great precision, it is 
evident that locally owned businesses benefit from them and that disaster 
development funds can work either with or against preexisting social 
networks.
124
 Although we see no harm, and much benefit, in seeking tools 
to better evaluate social capital—how it is created, what enhances it, and 
what diminishes it—Arrow is surely correct that an analysis of the 
importance of social networks and bottom-up disaster recovery efforts 
need not depend on the details of any particular measurement of social 
capital. 
Rather, highlighting the ways that economic behavior is situated in 
social context helps us avoid the mistake of assuming that outputs are 
connected to inputs by some mathematical, unvarying calculus.
125
 In sum, 
 
 
literature, in any event, seems to assume that what can be attained through social position and relations 
is not substitutable, at least not perfectly, with what can be bought. That is what makes social relations 
a form of capital distinct from financial capital.‖). 
 120. In particular, the posited distinction between economic capital amassed by individuals and 
social capital that exists only in exchange does not hold up to closer inspection. See Bankston & Zhou, 
supra note 116, at 286 (―Perhaps the greatest difference between ‗social capital‘ and ‗financial capital‘ 
or ‗human capital‘ is that ‗financial capital‘ and ‗human capital‘ can both be defined as specifiable 
quantities with definite locations in the socioeconomic arrangement of human affairs, while ‗social 
capital‘ cannot be so defined.‖). In fact, economic capital cannot exist independent of societal 
judgments concerning what counts as money and consensus concerning processes of exchange. See 
JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE REAL WORLD 126 (1998) 
(―Money cannot perform its functions in virtue of physics alone.‖). Capital, whether economic credit 
or social credibility, enables exchanges with other people and has no inherent value.  
 121. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) 
(arguing that human rationality involves the imaginative use of metaphor rather than linear logic). 
 122. Arrow, supra note 113, at 4. 
 123. Id.  
 124. See infra Part IV. 
 125. Within economics, scholars affiliated with the new economic sociology movement have 
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although social capital is primarily a sociological tool and not an economic 
concept, its value to disaster recovery efforts can be described in the 
language of economics: (1) as a solution to collective action problems; 
(2) as an indicator of whether individual residents are more likely to 
choose ―voice‖ or ―exit‖ when the community suffers losses in a disaster; 
and (3) as a way of reducing transaction costs.
126
 By sustaining a disaster-
stricken community‘s social capital, locally owned businesses have the 
potential to overcome economic coordination problems and to set the 
foundation for longer-term recovery. 
III. REVISITING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Advocates of corporate social responsibility contend that corporations 
ought to do more than maximize returns for their shareholders and that 
―the legitimate concerns of a corporation should include such broader 
objectives as sustainable growth, equitable employment practices, and 
long-term social and environmental well-being.‖127 The debate among 
legal scholars concerning corporate social responsibility focuses on how 
managers resolve tradeoffs between the needs of society and the interests 
of the corporation‘s shareholders.128 Cases in which those interests align 
are perceived as uninteresting or, worse, as phony justifications for 
corporate social responsibility.
129
 
 
 
made similar arguments. See, e.g., NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 6 (2001) (―Economic sociology is 
the study of how the material production and consumption of human populations depend on social 
processes for their structure and dynamics.‖). 
 126. See Harris, supra note 68, at 1458 (identifying first and third elements); Aldrich, Fixing 
Recovery, supra note 32, at 7 (identifying second element). Aldrich also discusses collective action 
problems, but he does not discuss conflicts between individual and collective rationality, and it is 
therefore not clear whether he means to employ the concept in its classic sense, or whether he is 
concerned more generally with the need to act collectively and to coordinate efforts. Id. 
 127. John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus 
Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 1–2 (2005) (summarizing 
the basic claims of corporate social responsibility proponents). 
 128. Recent contributions to the topic include the following: Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the 
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129 (2009); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: 
The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); 
Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate Social Responsibility: Dangerous and Harmful, Though Maybe Not 
Irrelevant, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1227 (1999); Peter Nobel, Social Responsibility of Corporations, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1255 (1999); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative 
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997) 
(reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)). 
 129. Dean Gordon Smith puts the matter plainly: 
When boards of directors are able to enhance employee welfare, make the environment 
cleaner, or improve human rights throughout the world without impairing shareholder value, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss5/3
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Part III.A evaluates the traditional theories of corporate social 
responsibility: classical and progressive. Part III.B contends that these 
theories are incomplete. By excluding closely held, locally owned 
businesses from the debate, the discussion has narrowly focused on 
governance issues between shareholders and managers in large business 
corporations. As a consequence, even advocates of corporate social 
responsibility have failed to fully consider how social capital can influence 
business choices. 
A. Agency Costs and Moral Obligation 
Classical and progressive theories of corporate social responsibility 
concern themselves with large, publicly traded corporations and offer two 
principal alternatives—that corporate managers benefit society indirectly 
by maximizing economic return for their shareholders or, alternatively, 
that managers should pursue other socially valuable goals, even at the cost 
of failing to maximize corporate profits.
130
 Thus, the two camps give 
diametrically opposed answers to the same question.
131
 For both classical 
and progressive scholars, the issue is the authority of corporate managers 
to decide to advance goals that provide no direct benefit for the 
corporation‘s shareholders.132  
1. The Classical Framework 
The dominant view of the corporation is that it is designed to maximize 
shareholder wealth.
133
 However, the proposition that corporations 
contribute to society by facilitating the aggregation and growth of capital 
 
 
they often do it. This is not ―corporate social responsibility,‖ but good management. And the 
failure to pursue such strategies would be a problem of managerial incompetence, not a 
problem of improper incentives. 
Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 1008 (citation omitted). 
 130. See Wells, supra note 6, at 78. 
 131. See Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What It Might Mean, if It Were 
Really to Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV. 557, 569 (1986) (―[I]n the conventional view, there is no true 
question of corporate social responsibility until the dilemma is presented in the form of whether to 
subordinate a clear-cut, economically optimal choice for some other, less profitable alternative.‖). 
 132. See Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 990 (―Pared to its core, ‗corporate law‘ is the set of 
rules that defines the decisionmaking structure of corporations.‖ (citation omitted)). 
 133. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Is There an Emerging Fiduciary Duty to 
Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75, 75 (2005) (―According to the majority of corporate 
law professors in the United States, a corporation‘s primary, and possibly exclusive, goal is to 
maximize shareholder wealth within the confines of the law.‖); see also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. 
COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 131 (9th ed. 
2004). 
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does not prohibit corporations from behaving responsibly in other ways.
134
 
Rather, it emphasizes the for-profit corporation‘s primary purpose: 
achieving lawful returns for its investors.
135
 Any departure from wealth 
maximization adds ―complexity‖ to the process by which shareholder 
investment drives economic activity.
136
 
If the fundamental question is ―whether it is socially desirable for 
corporations organized for profit voluntarily to identify and pursue social 
ends where this pursuit conflicts with the presumptive shareholder desire 
to maximize profit,‖137 the classical position holds that the answer is no. 
This skepticism includes charitable donations and any activity that the 
corporation engages in with an objective other than maximizing 
shareholder profits.
138
 Scholars operating within the classical framework 
identify several concerns associated with empowering management to 
follow a significantly more progressive agenda. 
 
 
 134. Socially responsible choices might be reserved to the discretion of the corporation‘s 
managers or dictated by law. For instance, in some European countries, there is a requirement for 
―labor representation on boards of directors.‖ Conley & Williams, supra note 127, at 2. 
 135. According to one theory, shareholders benefit when directors cannot be compelled to 
maximize their profits. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–81 (1999) (―[T]he primary job of the board of directors of a 
public corporation is not to act as agents who ruthlessly pursue shareholders' interests at the expense of 
employees, creditors, or other team members. Rather, the directors are trustees for the corporation 
itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members‘ competing interests in a fashion 
that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays together.‖) (emphasis in 
original). 
 136. See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for 
Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 574–75 (2009): 
Ordinarily, corporations obtain financing from shareholders and use it to purchase labor from 
employees, who in turn manufacture products that are sold to consumers. At the end of the 
day, consumers obtain a product in return for their payment, employees receive a wage for 
their labor, and shareholders get back a financial return on their investment. The production 
of altruism adds a layer of complexity to this process. When the corporation engages in 
philanthropy, it may satisfy the altruism demand of shareholders, employees, and consumers 
alike; every corporate stakeholder may feel good knowing that the firm is helping others. All 
three parties also pay: Consumers may pay more for the corporation's products, employees 
may take a lower wage to work for the corporation, and shareholders may accept a lower 
return on their investment. It is precisely this contortion of the usual producer-consumer 
relationship that makes corporate philanthropy controversial. 
 137. Engel, supra note 20, at 3 (―[T]he basic question of corporate social responsibility is not 
whether we wish to compel or forbid certain kinds of corporate conduct by legislative 
command . . . but rather whether it is socially desirable for corporations organized for profit 
voluntarily to identify and pursue social ends where this pursuit conflicts with the presumptive 
shareholder desire to maximize profit.‖). After all, if a particular course of action were truly calculated 
to earn greater profits for the corporation, now or in the future, then the corporation‘s managers would 
be expected to follow that course regardless of any inclination to behave ―responsibly.‖ Smith, 
Response, supra note 9, at 1008. 
 138. See Henderson & Malani, supra note 136, at 573 (―Corporations do not merely channel funds 
to nonprofits, but do many things to help others at the expense of corporate profits.‖). 
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First, managerial discretion increases agency costs. An individual 
might spend discretionary income on charity but, in the context of a public 
corporation, ―the pleasure taken . . . by the donors themselves‖ does not 
justify the use of shareholder money.
139
 Yet, because the markets in which 
large corporations operate are not perfectly competitive and management 
decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, ―the essential 
economic limit on the kinds of voluntarism we are discussing is the level 
of altruistic activity at which, were an outsider to try to wrest corporate 
control from the current managers and eliminate the altruistic practice, his 
expected gains from so doing would exceed his costs.‖140 The takeover 
constraint, however, leaves ample room for slack management, including 
deliberately non-wealth-maximizing choices.
141
  
Second, there is a concern about democratic legitimacy when a 
corporation‘s managers decide for themselves what social ends to pursue 
on behalf of society and how far to pursue those ends at the expense of 
shareholder profit.
142
 The shareholders elect the members of the board, 
with voting weighted according to shares held, but board members and the 
corporate officers that they appoint are not public officials and have no 
direct role in democratic decision making.
143
 Consequently, any 
distributive choices that they make absent specific legislative guidance 
may privilege certain objectives over others contrary to the real 
preferences of the relevant community.  
Indeed, one scholar contends that legislative guidance would be 
necessary to support an argument that corporations can serve non-wealth-
maximizing purposes: 
One cannot persuasively claim to have found an extra-profit goal 
that society wants corporations to pursue, unless one can offer at 
 
 
 139. Engel, supra note 20, at 22 (―And as soon as the matter is put that way it becomes apparent, 
as a question of both law and policy, that this ‗consumption‘ justification just does not work with 
respect to corporate donations.‖) (citations omitted). 
 140. Id. at 25. ―The less competitive the product market, the more the costs of altruism will be 
borne by the firm's customers rather than its shareholders.‖ Id. 
 141. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1997) (observing that formal oversight mechanisms including ―the market 
for corporate control‖ fail ―to provide a very robust check on managers‖ and offering alternative social 
explanations for the effectiveness of the corporate governance system). 
 142. Engel, supra note 20, at 30–31 (―Nor is there available—however much we might wish there 
were—any system of corporate ‗ethics‘ with which a given management can somehow legitimately 
and competently (but altruistically) make distributional decisions for the society.‖). 
 143. Henderson & Malani, supra note 136, at 582 (―Managers installed by shareholders to make 
money for shareholders are poorly positioned to know what the public good is or how best to deliver 
it.‖). 
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least a plausible explanation of why the legislature did not long ago 
enact liability rules, regulations, or other measures, to implement 
the goal in question quite independently of any management 
practice of social responsibility.
144
 
This is a puzzling claim, as it would seem to suggest that society does not 
want good Samaritans; after all, the law imposes no general duty to 
rescue.
145
 Perhaps, as is true for individual persons, the required minimum 
does not exhaust the social obligations of corporations.
146
 Also, the 
absence of mandatory regulation might be justified by administrative 
feasibility. The extent to which corporations ought to pursue non-profit-
maximizing goals across a wide range of possible scenarios involves too 
many variables to reduce to a clear rule.
147
 
Third, to the extent socially responsible choices are mandated by 
government regulation, advocates of the classical framework raise a 
different kind of democratic objection: that government cooption will 
mean the loss of the corporation as an effective mediating institution 
between the all-powerful state and the individual citizen.
148
 Also, such 
mandates may interfere with corporations‘ ability to generate profits, a 
loss of societal wealth that must be weighed against any benefits from 
greater corporate social responsibility.
149
 
 
 
 144. Engel, supra note 20, at 36. 
 145. See Christopher H. White, Note, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The Case for Reform of 
the Rescue Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 507 (2002) (―Under traditional common-law rules, 
individuals have no duty to come to the aid of others trapped in dangerous situations.‖). 
 146. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 131, at 567 (―[W]hile we acknowledge the legal right of citizens 
to do whatever they please within the bounds of the law, no society that ever existed has accepted the 
law as the only constraint on what is morally proper. On the contrary, every society we know of has 
encouraged its members to channel and temper their impulses by reference to moral codes, to engage 
in reflective ethical reasoning, even simply to practice good manners . . . .‖). 
 147. See id. at 568 (―[A]ttempts to enforce all social desiderata through law are costly. These costs 
include not only the obvious monitoring and enforcement costs—expenditures in the narrow sense—
but also less tangible social costs, such as the costs of enlarging the role of government while 
atrophying the moral timbre of the individual citizen.‖). 
 148. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 128, at 897 (arguing that the ―subordination of economic 
institutions to the state poses a grave threat to personal liberty‖). Professor Bainbridge contends that 
large corporations represent ―an intermediary institution standing between the individual and 
Leviathan.‖ Id. 
 149. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
733, 745 (2005) (―Arguments that socially responsible conduct would increase profits are . . . probably 
less about identifying profit-maximizing opportunities that corporations have missed than about 
helping create a patina of conceivable profitability that makes it easier for managers to engage in 
conduct that really sacrifices expected corporate profits.‖). 
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2. The Progressive Framework 
For progressive scholars, the true value of corporations‘ wealth-
generating activities is overstated, because the stock price does not fully 
reflect the costs to the environment, to labor rights, and even the basic 
social structure of society.
150
 The advocates of corporate social 
responsibility are not content with existing law that invests boards with the 
legal power to consider other stakeholders.
151
 Rather, in some fashion, 
progressive scholars ―want to impose on corporate decision-makers a legal 
duty to take into account the interests of the corporation‘s other 
constituencies, most often their employees and the communities where 
they are based.‖152 Greater social responsibility might be achieved by 
imposing a fiduciary duty on management to consider the interests of other 
stakeholders.
153
 Alternatively, corporate law might facilitate more 
inclusive decision making by giving non-shareholder constituencies a 
direct role in management.
154
  
In opposing the classical view, progressive corporate law scholars list a 
number of problems with unfettered corporate power. First, progressive 
scholars contend that economic power has become too concentrated and 
that the largest corporations threaten democracy.
155
 Second, they contend 
 
 
 150. See, e.g., Lynne Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE 
LAW 35, 36 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (contending that ―market theories define efficiency too 
narrowly and that efficiency cannot be separated from concepts of social justice and normative 
goals.‖); Greenfield, supra note 10, at 951 (―Given their nature, governance, and objectives, 
corporations fail in predictable ways. They produce costly externalities; they are amoral; they fail to 
sustain implicit or explicit commitments to communities; they privilege some stakeholders 
(shareholders) at the expense of others (for example, employees).‖); David Millon, Communitarians, 
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1378–79 (1993) 
(―For example, a plant closing may serve the interests of shareholders while imposing substantial 
uncompensated costs on laid-off workers and on a local community that has made infrastructure 
investments in the expectation of a continued corporate presence.‖). 
 151. Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 1000–01 (―Even if one were dissatisfied with the results of 
director discretion, it is clear that the U.S. corporate governance system already contains a substantial 
dose of ‗stakeholder governance.‘‖ (citation omitted)). 
 152. Wells, supra note 6, at 80–81. 
 153. See Greenfield, supra note 10, at 952 (―The law could recognize non-shareholder 
stakeholders as important non-equity investors in the firm, and the legal obligations of the board could 
be expanded to require it to look after the interests of those non-equity investors. The same duties of 
care and loyalty that are owed to shareholders would be owed to non-equity investors.‖). 
 154. See id. (―More provocatively, the board's makeup could be broadened to include 
representatives of non-equity investors. This would lead, almost inevitably, to the more equitable 
distribution of the corporate surplus among the firm's equity and non-equity investors, which would 
inure to the benefit of both society and the firm over time.‖). 
 155. See Greenfield, supra note 10, at 951 (―They manipulate regulatory oversight and exert 
disproportionate political power.‖); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Age of Aquarius or, How I (Almost) 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Free Markets, 88 MINN. L. REV. 921, 928–33 (2004) (book 
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that the logic of the market has displaced other important values.
156
 For 
instance, even accepting the proposition that corporations maximize 
wealth for the working class and the wealthy, progressive scholars 
question whether economic wealth is the same as welfare.
157
 Third, 
progressive scholars argue that the various constituencies affected by 
corporate activity cannot always bargain contractually to protect their 
interests.
158
 Without significant public regulation, disparities of 
information and power make it unlikely that corporate governance will 
aim toward socially acceptable outcomes.
159
 
Finally, advocates of greater corporate responsibility contend that the 
wealth-maximization project fails on its own terms.
160
 Rational economic 
actors could not generate the trust necessary for their markets to operate 
effectively. Indeed, ―[a] paradox arises in these situations—the conscious 
pursuit of self-interest is incompatible with its attainment.‖161 There is a 
moral dimension to the analysis: ―For the model to work, satisfaction from 
doing the right thing must not be premised on the fact that material gains 
may later follow; it must be intrinsic to the act itself.‖162 Although the 
details of the classical and progressive positions exceed the scope of this 
Article, it should already be clear that the scholars associated with each 
camp disagree on almost every significant point concerning corporate 
social responsibility. 
 
 
review) (identifying anti-democratic dangers of finance theory); Wells, supra note 6, at 80 (―The 
initial debate over corporate social responsibility emerged out of, and cannot be understood apart from, 
a vision of the American economy that first took root in the 1920s. That vision sees the American 
economy dominated by a small number of gigantic, stable corporations that essentially control the 
nation‘s business.‖). According to Professor Wells, progressive scholars in each generation have 
worried that ―[n]ot only do these corporations dominate American business, but they will, if left 
unchecked, continue to accrue economic, political, and social power.‖ Id. 
 156. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 948 (―The race for profits led corporations to massive layoffs to 
undo the burdens of the age of hierarchy, first of the traditionally vulnerable blue-collar worker whose 
vulnerability had been enhanced by his loss of union power, and then of the newly vulnerable white-
collar worker.‖). 
 157. Id. at 964 (―One‘s psychological measure of well-being is dependent on far more than the 
simple metric of absolute wealth.‖). 
 158. Millon, supra note 150, at 1379 (―Accordingly, one way in which communitarians differ 
from contractarians is in their greater willingness to use legal intervention to overcome the transaction 
costs and market failures that impede self-protection through contract.‖). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 10, at 966 (―The argument, as I understand it, is that 
corporate managers best advance society's interests by ignoring them. And not only should managers 
ignore social welfare, but they should be required to ignore it. Not even Adam Smith's invisible hand 
was assumed to be so powerful that people should be prohibited from taking the interests of others, or 
society in general, into account.‖). 
 161. William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law’s Duty of 
Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 139, 167 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 162. Id. 
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Notwithstanding their deep substantive disagreements, though, 
classical and progressive scholars generally accept that the issue is 
whether large, publicly traded corporations can serve interests aside from 
wealth-maximization for their shareholders.
163
 In other words, although 
they reach starkly different conclusions, corporate law scholars of both 
stripes address the same fundamental question. Consequently, the 
corporate social responsibility literature has almost nothing to say about 
the potential role of smaller, locally owned business. 
B. Beyond Agency Costs 
We contend that, as it has been framed, the corporate social 
responsibility debate has produced diminishing returns.
164
 First, whatever 
adjustments might be made at the margin,
165
 the locus of power in a public 
corporation will remain the board of directors.
166
 Second, despite the 
maxim that managers should seek to increase profits for the 
shareholders,
167
 corporate law rules permit managers to make charitable 
contributions and to take into account other interests.
168
 If the managers of 
 
 
 163. See Wells, supra note 6, at 79 (contending that the debates concerning corporate social 
responsibility have all been ―premised on the idea that the American economy was dominated by a 
relatively small number of enormous, powerful, and stable business corporations that were 
qualitatively different from their smaller competitors‖). 
 164. See Wells, supra note 6, at 78: 
Contemporary works on corporate social responsibility touch on deep and important 
questions: what does the corporation owe to its shareholders? to its workers? to the larger 
community? But there is a problem with these debates: they rarely seem to go anywhere. 
Viewed in historical perspective, it is clear that each new round of debate on corporate social 
responsibility largely recapitulates the earlier debate in a slightly altered form. 
 165. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 836 (2005) (advocating a greater governance role for shareholders), with Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1749 
(2006) (defending the dominance of directors in corporate decision-making). 
 166. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) (―The business and affairs of every 
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors . . . .‖). 
 167. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (―A business 
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end.‖); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 133, at 131 (―[D]irectors 
have great discretion over how to maximize the return to shareholders, but not whether to.‖). 
 168. Delaware law, for instance, specifically authorizes managers to ―[m]ake donations for the 
public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes.‖ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) 
(2006). These contributions must be reasonable but management decision making is protected by the 
business judgment rule and, absent self-dealing or other breaches of fiduciary duty, essentially 
unreviewable. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 286 (1998). 
From a strictly legal standpoint, there may not be much more to say. See Smith, Response, supra note 
9, at 990 (―Pared to its core, ‗corporate law‘ is the set of rules that defines the decisionmaking 
structure of corporations.‖). 
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large, public corporations nevertheless feel compelled to pursue profits to 
the exclusion of every other consideration, market pressures rather than 
legal rules are the likely culprit.
169
 
Moreover, the debate assumes a particular kind of corporation—the 
large, publicly held firm with diffuse, passive shareholders and 
responsibility for business affairs invested in a central group of 
managers.
170
 Separating ownership from control enables capital 
aggregation through passive investment,
171
 but the division of 
responsibility also produces agency costs to the extent that managers can 
find ways to prefer their own interests.
172
 Thus, if public corporations are 
the main characters in a story about social responsibility, it should not be 
surprising to find that agency costs are central to the plot. Framed in terms 
of agency costs, the corporate responsibility debate concerns the extent of 
management‘s power to serve non-shareholder interests rather than the 
reasons that could motivate a rational business corporation to choose to 
pursue socially useful objectives.  
A fuller account of corporate responsibility might begin, therefore, by 
considering the range of available business entities, closely held and 
publicly traded. Changing the scope of the inquiry adjusts the perspective. 
For instance, the agency-cost story of corporate social responsibility has 
little relevance in closely held businesses that are not characterized by a 
separation of ownership and control.
173
 Once shareholder and manager 
interests align, the corporate governance problem recedes, and it becomes 
 
 
 169. Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 996 (―While changes in the composition of the board of 
directors may have some marginal effects on corporate decisionmaking, market forces severely 
constrain the range of options available to the boards of large, publicly traded companies.‖). As Dean 
Smith puts it, ―powerful capital and takeover markets provide strong incentives for corporate managers 
to maximize profits.‖ Id. For a rare situation in which corporate law rules do require managers to focus 
exclusively on shareholder value, see Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986), holding that managers may not take into account other considerations once a sale of a 
company becomes inevitable. 
 170. See Wells, supra note 6, at 80. 
 171. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Who Bears the Costs of Lawyers’ Mistakes?—Against 
Limited Liability, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 885, 900–01 (2004) (―Agency efficiencies are manifested in terms 
of fiduciary managers employing the capital of passive investors—enabling the investors to take risk 
with minimal due diligence, to diversify, and to enter and exit investments at low cost.‖); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1595 (1988). 
 172. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 260 (2010) (―Tax-
avoidance strategies . . . can actually reduce firm value by allowing managers to manipulate the share 
price or otherwise extract rents.‖). 
 173. See McWilliams, supra note 171, at 901 (―By contrast, the close corporation manifests 
agency efficiencies in terms of unity of interest among active long-term investors, policymakers, and 
managers—different models altogether, distinguished in particular by the distinct roles of the residual 
claimants.‖). 
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possible to consider other, under-explored issues of corporate 
responsibility.  
There is no evidence to support a claim that any pursuit of social 
responsibility controverts the ―pure‖ business decision that would 
otherwise be generated through the economic calculation of an 
autonomous, disassociated entity. Except for a few specialized contexts—
such as market trading—business transactions are neither anonymous nor 
arms-length. Rather, business relationships are situated within a wider 
sphere of social intercourse. An expanded account of corporate social 
responsibility should include social motivations for choice and the socially 
embedded nature of economic activity. To frame a business decision in 
binary terms as profit seeking or altruistic is already to misunderstand the 
social context in which businesses operate.
174
 
For a smaller, locally owned business, the line between profit seeking 
and community obligation may not even be intelligible.
175
 Locally owned 
businesses exist in particular communities and rely upon reciprocal 
community obligations. These networks of trust and mutual support are 
social capital and enable a business to operate and to earn a profit. At the 
same time, they motivate the business owners to behave in a socially 
responsible fashion even at the expense of short-term profits. Although all 
business activity takes place in a social context, local business owners are 
especially likely to perceive their business interests as part and parcel of a 
broader set of interconnected social relationships.
176
 Just as human beings 
often have a variety of motivations, it may not matter to the owners 
whether a particular decision serves a business need or reflects a social 
obligation.
177
  
 
 
 174. See FLIGSTEIN, supra note 125, at 18 (describing ―social structures in markets‖ in terms of a 
―search for stable interactions with competitors, suppliers, and workers‖). However, a full exploration 
of economic sociology is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 175. For instance, if a local business owner provides temporary shelter for employees who are 
helping her restore her business, is that a charitable act or a business decisions? 
 176. To our knowledge, there has been only one empirical study comparing the levels of 
assistance provided after a natural disaster by locally owned and national corporations. See Okmyung 
Bin & Bob Edwards, Social Capital and Business Giving to Charity Following a Natural Disaster: An 
Empirical Assessment, 38 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 601, 602 (2009) (finding that ―[l]ocal branches of 
national chains were less likely than locally owned franchises to provide assistance to employees and 
less likely than independent local businesses to provide in-kind contributions to local relief and 
recovery efforts‖). 
 177. See Stone, supra note 131, at 559 (―It has always seemed to me that the best way to supply 
some hard content to the notion of corporate social responsibility is to go back and examine the 
general issue, what ‗being responsible‘ entails when our subject is not corporations, but ordinary flesh 
and blood mortals. What are we driving at when we enjoin an ordinary person to be responsible?‖). 
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To be sure, there remains a tension between profit seeking and social 
responsibility, and it is important to acknowledge the existence of 
tradeoffs, or else the problem of choice would dissolve. However, analysis 
of locally owned businesses shows that social responsibility and investor 
interests are not necessarily in conflict. First, decision-making occurs in an 
atmosphere of substantial uncertainty and there may be more than one 
plausible path toward profit.
178
 Decisions about marketing, product 
development, and the like can be approached in different ways. In a 
complex business environment, taking account of multiple time horizons, 
the more profitable course of action will not always be clear and greater 
attention to the social consequences of corporate decisions would not 
necessarily implicate profitability.
179
  
Second, even if a particular decision would sacrifice profits in order to 
serve some other purpose, or at least was not reasonably calculated to 
maximize profits, the business owners have substantial latitude to pursue 
any course they choose. Most locally owned businesses are closely held. 
Unlike public corporations, closely held businesses do not implicate Adolf 
Berle and Gardiner Means‘ famous diagnosis that corporate law is 
characterized by a fundamental separation of ownership and control.
180
 In 
closely held businesses, ownership and control overlap,
181
 and the owners 
may have strong social as well as business motivations for responding to 
community needs. Thus, we can ask the question a different way—how 
can the shareholders maximize the value of their investment? If all 
participants agree that value can be measured not solely in economic 
terms, then a model that divides altruism and profit seeking may ignore the 
owners‘ own judgments about value.182 
 
 
 178. See id. at 568 (―In the life of the enterprise, there are many occasions on which the managers 
have no ‗most profitable‘ option lying on their desks. Considering the uncertainties in any business‘ 
environment and the limited data available to it, there will be some range of choices all equally 
consistent with that ill-defined and elusive favorite of the economics textbooks, the investment 
uniquely calculated to maximize the shareholders‘ wealth.‖). 
 179. See Engel, supra note 20, at 9 n.30 (―It is, of course, a question of degree whether a given 
corporate action, not justified in terms of short term profits, is motivated, in whole or in part, by an 
expectation that it will augment long term profits, or solely by a desire to do the right thing in the 
society even at some risk to long term profits.‖). This holds true for public and private corporations. 
 180. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 181. 1 F. HODGE O‘NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O‘NEAL AND THOMPSON‘S CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:9 (rev. 3d ed. 2010) (―[C]lose corporations often 
unite the decision-making function and the risk-bearing function in one group, the shareholder-
managers.‖). 
 182. Cf. Engel, supra note 20, at 22 (contending that the justifications for individual and corporate 
altruism must be different, because if all other justifications were removed ―there would remain one 
vitally important justification applicable only to individual giving: the pleasure taken from it by the 
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Third, locally owned businesses strengthen the communities in which 
they reside. A local business not only provides goods and services, and 
sometimes employment opportunities, but, at the same time, builds social 
networks. Thus, even under a skeptical view of corporate responsibility in 
which ―a corporation should only engage in philanthropy when it is 
efficient for it to do so, that is, when it has a comparative advantage over 
other corporations and, importantly, nonprofit organizations and the 
government,‖183 we might conclude that locally owned businesses have an 
indispensable role to play in their communities. 
Nor is there a serious concern about democratic legitimacy. Locally 
owned businesses are not even arguably competitors with the nation state 
in terms of size and influence. They aggregate capital and may benefit 
from limited liability but do not have concentrated economic power.
184
 
When ownership and control are united, the use of corporate resources 
reflects the preferences of the residual beneficiaries of the firm‘s profits 
and not a quasi-governmental redistribution of their wealth.
185
 
IV. RESTORING NORMALCY  
In the context of disaster, the arguments against a progressive vision of 
corporate social responsibility lose much of their force.
186
 Disasters can 
involve harms of the most serious order, potentially including loss of life, 
 
 
donors themselves—the aspect of charitable giving that resembles any consumption expenditure. The 
analogous rationale, with respect to corporate donations could not, as a practical matter, rest on any 
pleasure taken by the shareholders. Rather, it would have to involve the gratification felt by 
management. And as soon as the matter is put that way it becomes apparent, as a question of both law 
and policy, that this ‗consumption‘ justification just does not work.‖) 
 183. Henderson & Malani, supra note 136, at 576. Professors Henderson and Malawi focus on 
public corporations and offer the example of ―Starbucks [which] can offer its coffee consumers the 
ability to help . . . farmers by purchasing fair trade coffee. Economists call this ‗economies of scope,‘ 
and it is something corporations likely have that most nonprofits do not.‖ Id. at 575. 
 184. Thus, political influence must usually be gained through trade associations or community 
politics. 
 185. For purposes of this argument, we assume that the owners are all in agreement. However, 
when majority owners use corporate resources for community purposes, it can at least be said that they 
are spending their own money as shareholders.  
 186. Finally, although it is not the argument we explore here, we note that even assuming that 
some management decisions work against corporation‘s own profitability, major disasters may be a 
special case and support a different standard for corporate responsibility. See Robert J. Rhee, Crisis, 
Rescue, and Corporate Social Responsibility Under American Corporate Law, in REFRAMING 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 127 (William 
Sun et al. eds., 2010) (contending that management‘s usual authority to pursue socially responsible 
goals should be enhanced in ―exigent circumstances‖); Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public 
Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 661 (2010) (same). 
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a sudden, total disruption of community order, and destruction of homes 
and essential infrastructure.
187
 Private assistance in restoring basic services 
and providing food, water, and shelter should require no authorizing 
official action.
188
 Nor is a complete account of the corporation‘s role in 
society necessary to support corporate philanthropy, because the 
immediate needs are clear and deserving of aid on any plausible theory of 
the corporation‘s role.189 Even assuming a strong connection between an 
exclusive focus on shareholder wealth maximization and an overall 
increase in societal liberty,
190
 the role for voluntary corporate giving in the 
wake of disaster would remain compelling.
191
 Needless to say, there has 
been no outcry over Wal-Mart‘s role in helping disaster victims after 
Hurricane Katrina or elsewhere. 
 
 
 187. What is a disaster?, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT 
SOCIETIES, http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-disaster 
(last visited May 12, 2012) (stating that a disaster is ―a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts 
the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or 
environmental losses that exceed the community‘s or society‘s ability to cope using its own 
resources‖).  
 188. Cf. Engel, supra note 20, at 27 (defending ―proposition that any social goal to be pursued by 
public corporations should have two closely related characteristics: first, a broad social consensus 
should support corporate pursuit of the particular goal in question; and second, some kind of 
reasonably clear social signal should be available to help each corporation figure out what actions are 
in furtherance of the goal.‖ (citations omitted)). According to Professor Engel, profit maximization is 
the goal most likely to satisfy his proposed test. Id. at 28. 
 189. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 558 (2002) (observing that ―‗incompletely 
theorized agreements‘ may be quite important for agreed public decisions‖ and that ―[a] consensus on 
public decisions may flourish so long as the exact grounds for that accord are not very precisely 
articulated‖) (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)). Thus, 
in the wake of disaster, there seems to be little basis for Professor Engel‘s assertion that ―I think no 
one would claim we have any very satisfactory ways—whether by philosophical inquiry or social 
scientific research—of ever saying with certainty that ‗Society wants this done, even though the 
legislature hasn‘t gotten around to it.‘‖ Engel, supra note 20, at 59. This is by no means a thorough-
going rebuttal of Professor Engel‘s argument, only a suggestion that there are, in fact, situations that 
command a broad consensus concerning the need for all responsible actors to help in whatever fashion 
they are able. 
 190. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 128, at 898 (―Economic liberty, in turn, is a necessary 
concomitant of personal liberty; the two have almost always marched hand-in-hand. . . . Accordingly, 
it seems fair to argue that the economic liberty to pursue wealth is an effective means for achieving a 
variety of moral ends.‖). 
 191. Moreover, although specific disasters may occur with little warning; there are a series of 
disaster plans in place at the national, state, and local level that embody society‘s commitment to come 
to the aid of disaster victims. Further, there is general consensus, and some legislation, prohibiting 
―price gouging.‖ See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT‘S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 4–5 (2009). 
These laws offer specific guidance to corporations and other businesses that the profit-maximization 
rules are, at least to that degree, suspended. But see John Shahar Dillbary, Emergencies, Body Parts, 
and Price Gouging, in LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009) (contending that 
high prices help markets allocate goods and services efficiently and do not evidence a failure of market 
ordering). 
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The case for the active involvement of locally owned business in 
disaster relief is even stronger. Unlike large public corporations, local 
businesses largely sidestep objections to corporate social responsibility 
based on agency costs or democratic accountability. Further, there is less 
reason to worry about a misallocation of resources if corporate managers 
are empowered to pursue non-wealth-maximizing goals. Locally owned 
businesses and their managers will be attuned to the community‘s 
priorities in the wake of disaster and well positioned to act. Indeed, in 
some cases a disaster response spearheaded by locally owned businesses 
may have more perceived legitimacy than the efforts of outside 
government officials.
192
 
Our principal aim in this Article is more theoretical than practical: We 
contend that locally owned business is vital to disaster recovery. Although 
we do not offer specific policy guidance, we conclude with two general 
considerations. First, locally owned businesses must survive before they 
can help their communities. Therefore, disaster plans should recognize a 
need to provide financial assistance to help locally owned businesses 
surmount short-term cash flow problems. Also, disaster planning should 
include tools to help local businesses cope with bureaucratic obstacles to 
restoring a previous business plan or developing a new strategy in 
response to changed needs in the community. As a general principle, legal 
rules should be designed to encourage local businesses to adapt 
entrepreneurially to the post-disaster landscape.  
Second, public officials can help locally owned businesses by 
respecting limits to the appropriate involvement of outside authorities. In 
particular, public relief efforts should strive to avoid duplication of tasks 
better left to local businesses and other community organizations.
193
 
Advance planning is important in this regard, because longer-term 
consequences may not seem as pressing, and yet those potential costs must 
be weighed against shorter-term benefits. For instance, providing free food 
over a long period of time and without need-based constraints could 
cripple the prospects for local grocery stores. Without a business sector, a 
 
 
 192. Admittedly, coordination problems can arise if businesses operate without any central 
supervision. In Haiti, for example, the weakness of the central government and its perceived corruption 
has led to a proliferation of Non-Governmental Organizations (―NGOs‖). Yet, the relief agencies 
sometimes lack knowledge of community needs. See, e.g., José De Córdoba, Aid Spawns Backlash in 
Haiti, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2010, at A1 (noting that aid has largely bypassed a corrupt and 
incompetent local government but that ―there is little coordination among the NGOs or between the 
NGOs and Haitian officials‖). 
 193. This point applies as well to non-profit aid workers and charitable organizations. 
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community cannot restore the jobs and income, to say nothing of the 
supply of goods and services that make recovery possible. 
A. Post-Disaster Entrepreneurship 
By sending signals about the health of the community and its ability to 
recover from disaster, rebuilding efforts led by locally owned businesses 
can accomplish more than well-intentioned programs implemented by 
government or outside relief agencies. As noted previously, strong 
community ties make local business more likely to stay and rebuild.
194
 
Even so, the decision to rebuild will not always be clear.
195
 After Katrina, 
for instance, pure economic rationality might have led many restaurant 
owners to relocate. The choice to cut bait seemed right, for instance, to 
―[h]igh-end steakhouse chain Smith & Wollensky,‖ which decided ―not 
[to] reopen its New Orleans restaurant.‖196 The chain is based in New 
York and its President, Eugene Zuriff, explained that the restaurant would 
―remain shuttered due to market conditions.‖197 Examining the same post-
disaster environment as the local restaurant owners who chose to stay, Mr. 
Zuriff‘s economic logic seemed impeccable: ―There‘s no lunch crowd, no 
substantial convention business. It‘s going to be a while.‖198  
The benefits of social capital can be gleaned, in part, from its apparent 
absence in Mr. Zuriff‘s decision-making. Residents of communities with 
high levels of social capital are inclined to ―work for a solution‖ rather 
than to leave, because they ―have more at stake should the neighborhood 
 
 
 194. For instance, Michael Brown, Community Service Coordinator at the Church of the Advent 
Hope, New York, New York, told us that his church solicits contributions for disaster relief from 
church members who run small businesses. Interview with Michael Brown, Community Service 
Coordinator, Chuch of the Advent Hope, New York, N.Y. (Mar. 30, 2011). He further opined that 
larger businesses are sometimes reluctant to contribute because they want to avoid a sectarian 
affiliation, whereas local businesses will gladly contribute for community recognition. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., Kyung Lah, Quake-hit Japanese City in Danger of Dying, CNN.COM (Mar. 25, 
2011; 4:43 PM EDT), available at http://cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/03/25/otsuchi.japan.quake/ 
index.html? hpt2c1 (―[Y]ou can see the survivors making the choice as they walk through the debris-
strewn main street of Otsuchi in Japan—stay or go?‖). As the author observes, the ―dilemma is the 
same for them all: do you stay and rebuild in a devastated small town, struggling economically even 
before the tsunami, or pull up stakes and start anew in a big city?‖ Id. 
 196. Russ Britt, Smith & Wollensky to Close New Orleans Restaurant, MARKETWATCH, Apr. 6, 
2006. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Zuriff added, ―Things haven‘t gotten back together. I 
mean, you have like 24 people running for mayor, what does that tell you?‖ Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In part, Mr. Zuriff‘s comments may reflect not only a lack of commitment on his part 
but a reciprocal community judgment that his business was not worth saving. 
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not recover successfully.‖199 However, local businesses will not stay to 
contribute unless they have a business plan that makes sense. The social 
context for economic activity does not obviate the need to bring in revenue 
and generate profits. 
Disasters upend existing businesses and require owners to ―revisit 
activities typically associated with the start-up phase of the business life 
cycle.‖200 To restore operations, a local business must reassemble its 
employees, its management team, its physical headquarters, and it must 
quickly establish a source of revenue.
201
 Also, the business owners will 
engage in strategic planning to decide how to address new opportunities 
and the possible foreclosure of an existing business model.
202
 In all these 
respects, the post-disaster context is analogous to the situation faced by a 
new, start-up business. In fact, ―some businesses become quite 
entrepreneurial during a disaster response and surviving businesses can 
contribute quite early to assist in disaster recovery, if officials understand 
their needs.‖203 
FEMA has circulated for comment a draft National Recovery 
Framework that recognizes a role for locally owned business in disaster 
recovery.
204
 The Framework states that local businesses are ―crucial in 
restoring the economic health of a community.‖205 Also, the Framework 
asserts that disaster recovery requires more than the rebuilding of physical 
infrastructure: ―It focuses on how best to restore, reconstruct and 
redevelop the social, natural, and economic fabrics of the community.‖206 
The Framework‘s longer-term perspective builds upon a previous plan that 
 
 
 199. Aldrich, Social, Not Physical, Infrastructure, supra note 100, at 8. As Professor Aldrich 
observes, social capital explains why individuals choose the political mechanism of ―voice‖ rather than 
the simpler, economic remedy: ―exit.‖ Id. (citing HIRSCHMAN, supra note 83). Although Aldrich does 
not pursue the point, social capital theory seems promising as a way of giving content to Hirschman‘s 
theory of loyalty, which a number of commentators have observed is less developed than his 
explanation of the voice and exit mechanisms. 
 200. Zolin & Kropp, supra note 49, at 185. 
 201. See id. (noting that ―the ability to retain a revenue stream through a crisis‖ is crucial). 
 202. See id. at 188 (stating that Hurricane Katrina ―changed the business environment and created 
new opportunities and challenges, plunging each business into a strategy revision, similar to that 
experienced by a new enterprise‖). 
 203. Id. at 197. 
 204. See FEMA, National Disaster Recovery Framework (Draft, Feb. 5, 2010), available at 
http://disasterrecoveryworkinggroup.gov/ndrf.pdf [hereinafter Framework]. The Framework states that 
―[i]n September 2009, the President charged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to establish a Long-Term Disaster Recovery 
Working Group . . . to provide operational guidance for recovery organizations, as well as to make 
recommendations for improving the nation‘s approach to disaster recovery.‖ Id. at 2. 
 205. Id. at 16. 
 206. Id. at 5. 
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―anticipates the need for long-term recovery, [but] addresses primarily 
actions during disaster response.‖207  
However, despite its recognition of the importance of a community‘s 
social fabric, the Framework appears to overlook the importance of local 
business to economic recovery. According to the Framework‘s proposed 
timetable, disaster recovery efforts can be divided into stages: 
(1) immediate response; (2) stabilization activities; (3) intermediate 
recovery; and (4) long-term recovery.
208
 On this timetable, local business 
initiatives become significant only after intermediate-range recovery 
efforts take place, including population recovery.
209
 The long-term 
initiatives include as a goal, ―Implementing economic and business 
revitalization strategies.‖210 
Yet, if locally owned businesses can help the members of a disaster-
affected community to overcome collective action problems, then signals 
sent by revitalized businesses could be an important factor in individual 
decisions to return.
211
 As one commentator observes, local commercial 
activity is a kind of ―[m]utual assistance‖ in that it ―serves as a source of 
material support, but, more important, it sends signals that members of a 
community are committed to recovery and helps to restore the fabric of 
communities torn apart by disaster.‖212 Therefore, ―[o]nce . . . immediate 
concerns are met, the reestablishment of working social and economic 
systems ought to take priority because they are the foundation on which 
long-term recovery must be constructed.‖213 
Accordingly, the Framework‘s intermediate goals would seem to 
benefit from earlier, more sustained attention to the needs of local 
businesses. For many such businesses, recovery must be early or not at all. 
If permission to rebuild cannot be acquired swiftly, a business may simply 
run out of operating capital or decide to relocate. The loss costs the 
community both economic and social resources, but the current 
Framework appears to assign only an economic value to locally owned 
businesses: ―Businesses play a critical role in the stabilization and 
 
 
 207. Id. at 6. 
 208. Id. at 9–11. 
 209. Id. at 10. The only exception is the stated goal of ―[r]eturning . . . displaced populations and 
businesses if appropriate.‖ Id. The Framework does not elaborate on the concept of business return, 
though it may be significant if it involves ―a plan that helps businesses get to their physical locations to 
recover key records and equipment.‖ Zolin & Kropp, supra note 49, at 198. 
 210. Framework, supra note 204, at 11. 
 211. See supra Part II. 
 212. Chamlee-Wright, supra note 82, at 239. 
 213. Id. at 253. 
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revitalization of the local economy as employers, service and goods 
providers, investors, developers, planners and in other economic roles 
needed to achieve a sustainable recovery and prosperous community.‖214 
Disaster-planning officials should recognize that the economic importance 
of locally owned business is inseparable from its social importance.  
This Article does not assess the relative merits of various economic 
incentives that might be used to support the entrepreneurial efforts of 
locally owned businesses. In remarks delivered in New Orleans on 
September 15, 2005, then-President George W. Bush outlined a number of 
economic proposals that formed the basis for subsequent legislation: 
Tonight, I propose the creation of a Gulf opportunity zone, 
encompassing the region of the disaster in Louisiana and 
Mississippi and Alabama. Within this zone, we should provide 
immediate incentives for job-creating investment; tax relief for 
small businesses; incentives to companies that create jobs; and loans 
and loan guarantees for small businesses, including minority-owned 
enterprises, to get them up and running again. It is entrepreneurship 
that creates jobs and opportunity. It is entrepreneurship that helps 
break the cycle of poverty. And we will take the side of 
entrepreneurs as they lead the economic revival of the Gulf 
region.
215
 
While the reviews of the Gulf Zone Opportunity Act of 2005 (―GO 
ZONE‖)216 have been mixed, the general principle seems correct.217 
Government assistance, whether in the form of tax incentives, loans, or 
direct payments, can give locally owned businesses a chance to succeed in 
the aftermath of disaster. In turn, the viability of local business strengthens 
a community‘s social networks and has a multiplier effect on the overall 
prospects for recovery. 
Recognizing the importance of the business community, ―states are 
beginning to create business emergency operations centers within their 
emergency management teams, which increases communications between 
the private and public sectors during emergencies and strengthens overall 
 
 
 214. Framework, supra note 204, at 16. 
 215. Remarks of President George W. Bush, New Orleans, LA, in President Bush Delivers 
Remarks on Hurricane Katrina Recovery, WASH. POST. (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/15/AR2005091502252.html. 
 216. Gulf Zone Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 109-35, 119 Stat. 2577 (2005). 
 217. See, e.g., Kimberly E. Smith, The GO ZONE Act: An Innovative Mechanism for Promoting 
Economic Recovery for the Gulf Coast, 77 MISS. L.J. 807 (2008). 
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disaster response and recovery efforts.‖218 These efforts appear to focus on 
the establishment of public-private partnerships rather than on the 
standalone value of local business. However, both FEMA and the Small 
Business Administration (―SBA‖) provide materials to help local 
businesses plan for disaster.
219
 Moreover, disaster recovery loans are 
available from the SBA for qualifying businesses.
220
 By providing 
information and financial resources, governments at the federal, state, and 
local level can help businesses make entrepreneurial investments in 
community recovery. 
B. Market-Distorting Signals 
Current disaster law and policy often misses opportunities to help 
locally owned businesses restore their communities after catastrophe and 
sometimes actually works at cross-purposes, diminishing their social 
capital.
221
 Top-down relief efforts are necessary in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster, but care should be taken to avoid stifling local 
recovery efforts, including the repair of social networks: ―Noise emanating 
from policies can muffle [recovery] signals, however—or squelch them 
altogether by failing to provide and enforce the rules of the game for 
rebuilding or by creating rules that forbid or delay such reopenings 
. . . .‖222 Thus, locally owned businesses should not only be recognized in 
the broader context of corporate social responsibility, but should also be 
included in disaster planning. 
In particular, public relief efforts should take care to avoid squelching 
the efforts of locally owned businesses. If the ultimate goal of disaster 
relief efforts is to help a community recover fully from disaster, then a 
particular ―hazard of in-kind charitable or volunteer activity is that it will 
compete with and harm still viable commercial enterprises, undermining 
 
 
 218. FEMA Release No. HQ-11-213, FEMA Administrator: Business Community is Critical 
Partner in Disaster Response and Recovery, available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease 
.fema?id=59308 (Nov. 4, 2011). The FEMA Release states that FEMA has launched a similar liaison 
program. Id. 
 219. See Disaster Planning, READY.GOV, http://www.ready.gov/business; http://www.sba.gov/ 
content/disaster-planning (last visited May 12, 2012). 
 220. See Disaster Assistance, SBA.GOV, http://www.sba.gov/content/disaster-assistance (last 
visited May 12, 2012). 
 221. See CHAMLEE-WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 170 (contending that ―[i]f policy makers have the 
wrong paradigm in mind—if they believe that it is primarily government that rebuilds communities . . . 
[w]e end up fostering an environment in which private decision makers have less and less ability to tap 
their capacity as property owners, service providers, and community leaders‖). 
 222. Chamlee-Wright, supra note 82, at 240. 
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the community‘s long-term economic viability.‖223 Thus, according to one 
scholar, the slow pace of recovery in New Orleans may have been 
attributable to an excess of ―orchestrated and centralized government 
effort‖ rather than a ―lack of government resources.‖224 On this view, by 
taking over recovery efforts, ―public policy is distorting the signals 
emerging from markets and civil society that would otherwise foster a 
swift and sustainable recovery.‖225 
Whether this criticism of post-Katrina recovery efforts is warranted, we 
contend that government-sponsored disaster relief should acknowledge the 
vital role of social capital in longer-term community life recovery and 
should include locally owned businesses in comprehensive disaster 
planning: 
Not only the built environment matters in people‘s assessment of 
whether their community is rebounding, but also the return of social 
systems that connect individuals and their families to one another 
through formal and informal neighborhood groups and through the 
services and social spaces created by schools, businesses, religious 
groups, and nonprofit organizations. In such a context, the signals 
coming out of civil and commercial society—signals about who is 
coming back and when, and what services will be provided—play a 
critical role in the recovery process.
226
 
Social systems are not a secondary consideration: once government 
officials have coordinated immediate rescue and relief measures to save 
lives and mitigate ongoing safety hazards, the longer-term recovery plan 
should include efforts to strengthen any signals of recovery that the 
community can generate and, at a minimum, should avoid stifling those 
signals.  
FEMA‘s draft Framework explicitly recognizes the importance of 
inclusive planning and that ―non-governmental partners in the private and 
non-profit sectors (i.e., local businesses, owners and operators of critical 
 
 
 223. See George Horwich, Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake, 48 ECON. DEV. & 
CULTURAL CHANGE 521, 532 (2000). Professor Horwich offers an example of this from his study of 
the Kobe earthquake. Id. (noting that ―private for-profit medical clinics complained that the Red Cross 
hospitals were providing relief care well past the time it was justified.‖). 
 224. Chamlee-Wright, supra note 82, at 237 (arguing ―that government policy and programs are 
the principal source of the problem‖). Given the overall climate of neglect in some of the poorest 
neighborhoods, there would seem to be room for an argument that aid programs were also misdirected. 
However, a full analysis of the allocation of relief resources in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast is 
beyond the scope of our current project. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 238. 
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infrastructure and key resources; and voluntary, faith-based and 
community organizations, foundations, philanthropic groups and academic 
institutions) play a significant role in meeting local needs.‖227 This is a key 
issue and worth emphasizing. In providing disaster relief, there is a fine 
line between the supply of necessary assistance and the dampening of 
organic recovery efforts. The first, overriding priority is to save lives and 
to mitigate suffering. However, well-intentioned aid can produce 
unintended consequences. Humanitarian assistance may actually 
undermine long-term development goals. Poorly thought through aid can 
have unfortunate consequences for locally owned businesses. 
For example, one study of small business recovery after Hurricane 
Katrina reported the negative reaction of business owners to outside relief 
efforts coordinated by FEMA.
228
 These reconstruction efforts focused on 
physical infrastructure and ―exacerbat[ed] the shortage of workers in the 
area by providing ‗too much‘ financial assistance to persons displaced by 
the storm, and ‗poach[ed]‘ workers from local construction firms.‖229 
Short-term recovery efforts and disaster mitigation thus displaced longer-
term rebuilding by starving local business of resources.
230
  
The problem is that disaster planning and response tends to focus on 
physical infrastructure.
231
 Government, insurance, and other large 
businesses contribute resources to repair and rebuild roads, replace 
housing, and otherwise address physical damage in disaster-ravaged areas. 
Recent studies, however, show that social networks—as opposed to 
amount of aid or damage—are key to recovery.232 Accordingly, in order to 
 
 
 227. Framework, supra note 204, at 13. 
 228. Rodney C. Runyan & Patricia Huddleston, Small Business Recovery from a Natural 
Disaster: Lessons from Katrina, in LAW AND RECOVERY FROM DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 127 
(Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009). Although they focus on small business rather than locally owned 
business, the distinction does not appear significant as their definition of small business requires that it 
be ―independently owned and operated‖ and their surveys were limited geographically to areas 
damaged by Katrina. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See Chamlee-Wright, supra note 82, at 253 (―[I]f markets are to rebound robustly, employers 
must be able to attract employees. Employment of local workers by relief agencies should not be 
undertaken with the aim of creating jobs.‖). Professor Chamlee-Wright further recommends that 
financial relief be offered in ―the form of one-time payments . . . regardless of employment status‖ in 
order to ―reduce the distortions in the local labor market, and avoid the politically difficult decision to 
cut off the stream of unemployment benefits.‖ Id. 
 231. If adopted, the draft Framework would represent a significant improvement over the status 
quo. 
 232. See Mayumi Sakamoto & Katsuya Yamori, A Study of Life Recovery and Social Capital 
Regarding Disasater Victims: A Case Study of Indian Ocean Tsunami and Central Java Earthquake 
Recovery, 31 J. NAT. DISASTER SCI. 13, 14 (2009) (contending that, ―[o]n a long-term basis, the most 
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take advantage of social capital and to foster bottom-up rebuilding, 
policymakers must reorient problem solving to include social 
infrastructure. A plan that excludes local businesses may damage existing 
community strengths and hamper rebuilding. 
City planners in Tuscaloosa, Alabama have struggled with these issues 
in the aftermath of extensive tornado damage as they formulate a 
comprehensive rebuilding plan to create ―multi-use corridors within the 
tornado recovery zone.‖233 Local business owners have been vocal in their 
opposition to a plan that could pose impediments to rebuilding damaged or 
destroyed businesses and that does not adequately clarify zoning issues.
234
 
On the other hand, Tuscaloosa has an opportunity to address 
vulnerabilities, physical and social, for the longer term. Thus, plan 
advocates ―see it as paving the way for a better city business district, more 
cohesive neighborhoods and an enhancement to the Tuscaloosa quality of 
life.‖235 However, setting the Tuscaloosa recovery plan aside, 
improvements to existing uses can become Utopianism if planners too 
readily give themselves over to an imagined future dotted with green 
spaces, organic grocery stores, and boutiques well stocked with artisanal 
crafts. To put the point gently, the priorities of those charged with city 
planning may not work equally well for every demographic group. 
Further, like any Utopian project, there is a danger that insufficient 
attention will be paid to the transitional dislocations that will ensue. 
To be clear, our focus on bottom-up recovery efforts should not be 
confused with a blame-the-victim position or with a claim that government 
assistance programs are part of the problem.
236
 Nor do we contend that the 
 
 
important factor [for life recovery] was characterized by the term ‗social ties,‘ specifically referring to 
human networks‖). 
 233. Jason Morton, Zoning Changes Within Tornado Zone Unveiled, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, Oct. 
18, 2011, available at http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20111018/NEWS/111019701?tc= obinsite. 
 234. See Jason Morton, Tuscaloosa Forward Plan Passes Unanimously, TUSCALOOSA NEWS, 
Sept. 7, 2011, available at http://www.tuscaloosanews.com/article/20110907/NEWS/110909820 
(―‗Small-business property owners . . . feel like they‘ve been deleted from the (future of 
Tuscaloosa)‘. . . .‖) (quoting local-business owner) (first set of ellipses in original). 
 235. Id. (―‗The consensus is that people want (small businesses) to come back‘ . . . . ‗But no, we 
don‘t want it to go back the way it was. These are changes that (residents) wanted to see.‘‖) (quoting 
Joan Barth, ―secretary of Tuscaloosa Neighbors Together, a grassroots community group‖). Mixed-use 
communities have many advantages over communities segregated into business and residential zones, 
and disasters create a need and an opportunity for longer-range planning. See ANDRES DUANY ET AL., 
SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000).  
 236. See, e.g., Jamie Peck, Liberating the City: Between New York and New Orleans, 27 URB. 
GEOGRAPHY 681, 702 (2006) (reporting that one commentator had asserted that if ―‗chronically craven 
and indolent‘ local officials had the wit to announce that the next round of welfare checks would be 
issued in Baton Rouge, then no doubt ‗people would have somehow found a way to get out‘‖) (quoting 
G. Neumayr, The Desolate City, AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Nov. 2005, at 48–50). 
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answer to natural disaster in urban settings is to couple zero-tolerance 
policing ―minimalist supply-side interventions‖ designed to ―cater[] 
explicitly to business, taxpayers, and the middle classes, for whom the 
restructured city must be made safe and welcoming.‖237 We reject a 
simplistic choice between identifying classes of victims and fostering 
individual responsibility.
238
 Rather, we contend that disaster planning and 
response should recognize that individuals and communities may be both 
susceptible to harm and resilient. Local business has an important role to 
play in sustaining and creating the social capital that makes full recovery 
possible. 
CONCLUSION 
Publicly traded corporations aggregate capital from investors across the 
nation and worldwide. However, the residual beneficiaries of the firm are 
unlikely to live in the same community and will be rationally ignorant 
concerning the firm‘s activities. Dispersed shareholding may be a boon for 
efficient capital allocation, but it does not tend to build strong social ties 
between a national corporation and the communities where it operates. 
When the shareholders are local, they may have connections to the 
community through their business and through any number of other civic 
organizations. 
Locally owned businesses are part of the community and contribute to 
the economic and social aspects of longer-term life recovery after disaster. 
Locally owned businesses will never match the Wal-Marts of the world in 
their ability to distribute vast quantities of blankets, portable generators, 
and, for that matter, Pop-Tarts, but they are essential to the disaster 
resilience of their communities. 
 
 
 237. Peck, supra note 236, at 704 (arguing that such policies represent ―socially invasive 
interventions directed at a criminalized, feckless, and morally bankrupt class of the urban poor, from 
whom preferred citizens must be shielded at all costs‖). 
 238. Id. at 706 (summarizing the argument: ―It was therefore not a lack of resources, private 
transportation, or out-of-town support systems that placed some of the most-needy New Orleans 
residents in the storm‘s path; it was the long-run consequences of urban welfarism—and its racialized 
cast of supported characters . . . .‖). 
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